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BATSON FOR JUDGES, POLICE OFFICERS & TEACHERS:
LESSONS IN DEMOCRACY FROM THE JURY BOX
Stacy L. Hawkins*
In our representative democracy we guarantee equal participation for all, but
we fall short of this promise in so many domains of our civic life.  From the
schoolhouse, to the jailhouse, to the courthouse, racial minorities are under-
represented among key public decision-makers, such as judges, police officers, and
teachers.  This gap between our aspirations for representative democracy and the
reality that our judges, police officers, and teachers are often woefully under-repre-
sentative of the racially diverse communities they serve leaves many citizens of color
wanting for the democratic guarantee of equal participation.  This critical failure of
our democracy threatens to undermine the legitimacy of these important civic insti-
tutions.  It deepens mistrust between minority communities and the justice system
and exacerbates the failures of a public education system already lacking accounta-
bility to minority students.
But there is hope for rebuilding the trust, accountability and legitimacy of
these civic institutions on behalf of minority citizens.  There is one place where we
have demonstrated a deeper commitment to our guarantee of democratic equality on
behalf of minority citizens and exerted greater effort to that end than perhaps in
any other domain of our civic life—the jury box.  This paper recounts this impor-
tant history and explores the political theory underlying the equal protection juris-
prudence of jury selection.  It then applies these lessons gleaned from the jury
context to the constitutional defense of efforts to achieve greater racial diversity
within the judiciary, law enforcement, and public education, all of which are as
important to the legitimacy of our democracy today as the jury has been throughout
American history.
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“[I]f liberty and equality . . . are [ ] to be found in democracy,
they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the
government to the utmost.”
– Aristotle1
I swear to the Lord,





The stark contrast in voice reflected in the above quotes echoes the
contrasting sentiments they embody.  On the one hand, we guarantee that
all persons are equal and, therefore, ought to have an equal share in the
process of democratic self-government.  That is the formal expression of
our aspirational ideal for democratic equality.  On the other hand, the
lived experience for many racial minorities is one of exclusion from partic-
ipation in our democracy.3  Historically that exclusion was total, but even
1. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS  156 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Dover Publications, Inc. 2000)
(1885).
2. Langston Hughes, The Black Man Speaks in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LANGSTON
HUGHES: THE POEMS 1941-1950, at 76 (2011).
3. The term “racial minorities” is used herein interchangeably with “minorities.” Both
terms are imprecise in designating the group of non-White persons to whom they refer.  The
social construction of race renders its use necessarily context-dependent. See IAN HANEY LOPEZ,
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today people of color experience far from equal participation in the many
institutions that comprise our democracy.4 Although we continue to fall
short in realizing the promise of democratic equality, there is one demo-
cratic domain where we have fared better, and more importantly, tried
harder, in realizing our aspirations for democratic equality than most
others—the jury box.5
This paper draws on lessons from the jury context to suggest how we
ought to do democracy more broadly.  Specifically, the focus here is on
applying these jury insights to demands for increasing racial diversity
among judges, police officers, and teachers as key democratic decision-
makers not wholly unlike jurors in the extent to which they too ought to
adequately reflect the communities they serve.  Although there is a fairly
wide legal literature calling for greater racial diversity among judges in par-
ticular, and to some lesser extent among police officers and teachers, this
contribution to that literature is unique insofar as it draws an analogy be-
tween these contemporary calls for greater racial diversity among judges,
police officers, and teachers as key democratic decision-makers, and a long
history and tradition of pursuing increased racial diversity among a differ-
ent set of key democratic decision-makers - jurors.6  This paper bridges
the gap in the existing literature by first recounting the deep history and
tradition of guaranteeing democratic equality in jury selection through ef-
forts to ensure racial diversity among jurors,7 and then applying those jury
insights to judges, police officers, and teachers.8
The jury literature is extensive.9 Many scholars have extolled the
democratic virtues of increased racial diversity among juries made possible
by, among other things, doctrinal developments in the equal protection
jurisprudence of jury selection.10  The jury selection system is by no
means perfect,11 but it has improved dramatically over time to expand the
racial diversity of jurors.12  A likely reason for this exceptional approach in
WHITE BY LAW (2006).  As used herein, these terms are meant to refer to those racial and ethnic
minority groups, including Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, who have or continue to suffer from
legal and social discrimination and who remain underrepresented among key public decision-
makers in many domains of our democracy. See id.; see also infra Section III.C.  Native Americans
are excluded from this reference as used herein because of the complex political relationship
between sovereign Native American tribes and the U.S. government. See JILL NORGREN &
SERENA NANDA, AMERICAN CULTURAL PLURALISM AND LAW 4-5 (2006).
4. See LOPEZ, supra note 3.
5. See infra Section I.D.
6. See infra Section I.
7. See infra Section I.C.
8. See infra Section II.A.
9. See infra Section I.A.
10. See id.
11. Scholarly critiques of the jury system are as numerous as articles boasting of the jury
system. See infra note 112.
12. See infra Section I.D.
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the jury context is that the jury is held up as emblematic of our highest
ideals for democratic self-government.13 Underlying these efforts is an ac-
knowledgment that the failure to ensure racial diversity among jurors be-
trays our fundamental commitment to democratic equality.14
Despite this long history and tradition of valuing racial diversity in
jury selection and service, and the concerns for democratic equality in-
forming this tradition, we have largely failed to appreciate parallel concerns
for democratic equality that might animate similar calls for greater racial
diversity among judges, police officers, and teachers.  The jury may be a
unique feature of our democracy, but there are many other democratic
institutions that serve as equally important sites of civic participation in our
democracy.  In a democracy “of the people, by the people, and for the
people,” these institutions should similarly reflect a commitment to racial
diversity as a guarantee of democratic equality.15  This paper suggests that
how we treat jury selection, and in particular, our deliberate efforts to
promote racial diversity in jury service, ought to be instructive for how we
pursue racial diversity and approach selection for civic participation in
these other democratic domains.16
This paper is divided into three parts.  Part I explains the democratic
significance of juries and traces the deep, historic intersection between
juries and race in America.  Synthesizing political theory, social science
research and the equal protection jurisprudence of jury selection, this Part
first identifies why the jury is an exemplar of our democratic ambitions for
self-government and then reveals why racial diversity in jury selection and
service is critical to the realization of those democratic ambitions.
Borrowing from the theory of representative bureaucracy in the pub-
lic administration literature, Part II extends the democratic lessons of the
jury to the judiciary, law enforcement and public education.  By demon-
strating that each of these other civic domains also has great significance in
our democracy and poses equal challenges to our aspirations for demo-
cratic equality when public decision-makers in these domains fail to ade-
quately reflect the diversity of the citizens they serve, this Part suggests
some basis for analogizing these domains with the jury. Part II offers both
theoretical and empirical support for the claim that the lack of racial diver-
sity among judges, police officers, and teachers not only betrays our com-
mitment to democratic equality, but also undermines the legitimacy of our
democracy.
Finally, Part III offers some preliminary ideas for how we might ad-
dress the democratic dilemma posed by the existing lack of racial diversity
among judges, police officers, and teachers without violating the constitu-
13. See infra Section I.A.
14. See infra Section I.C.
15. Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
16. See infra Section II.A. and B.
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tional proscription on government uses of race.  Borrowing lessons from
the equal protection jurisprudence of jury selection, this Part suggests that
we can similarly engage in deliberate, race-conscious efforts to promote
greater diversity among judges, police officers, and teachers in constitu-
tionally permissible ways.  The equal protection jurisprudence of jury se-
lection reveals that the democratic legitimacy attained when public
decision-makers reflect the diversity of the communities they serve is un-
doubtedly a compelling government interest.  By structuring these race-
conscious efforts to mirror those that have been undertaken in the jury
context, they can be narrowly tailored in ways that promote meaningful
racial diversity within the judiciary, law enforcement, and public education
while also ensuring their constitutionality.
I. JURIES, DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY, AND RACIAL DIVERSITY
A. Juries and Democracy
Juries occupy a special place of significance as a civic institution in
our democracy.17  Virtually every scholarly work on juries recognizes trial
by jury as the quintessential and most revered feature of our unique demo-
cratic republic.18 In a system of representative democracy, where few
of the governed actually get to govern, juries offer the opportunity for
direct democratic participation.19  Juries, in other words, signify democ-
17. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 1-2 (1994) (“Trial by jury is about the best of democracy and about the worst of
democracy. . . the jury. . . exposes the full range of democratic vices and virtues.  No other
institution of government rivals the jury in placing power so directly in the hands of citizens. . .
no other institution . . . wagers more on the truth of democracy’s core claim that the people
make their own best governors. . . the jury version of democracy stands almost alone today in
entrusting the people at large with the power of government.”).
18. Id.; see also Jenny Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825 (2015); Nancy
S. Marder, Juries Justice & Multiculturalism, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 659, 660 (2002) (describing the
jury’s populist function in our democracy); Vikram Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin
to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203 (1995).
19. Representative democracy, in which the people are governed by elected representa-
tives, can be contrasted with direct democracy, in which the people engage in direct self-rule.
See DANIELLE ALLEN, TALKING TO STRANGERS: ANXIETIES OF CITIZENSHIP SINCE Brown v.
Board of Education 22 (2004) (describing this conflict as “democracies inspire in citizens an aspira-
tion to rule and yet require citizens to constantly live with the fact that they do not.”). See also
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 407 (citing Alexis de Tocqueville’s description of our jury system as
“rais[ing] the people itself . . . to the bench of judicial authority [and] invest[ing] the peo-
ple . . . with the direction of society.”); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 7 (noting that “[i]n
a democracy, the legitimacy of the law depends on acceptance by the people.  And the jury
remains our best tool for ensuring that the law is being applied in a way that wins the people’s
consent”); Kevin R. Johnson & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, A Principled Approach to the Quest for
Racial diversity on the Judiciary, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 5, 34 (2004) (noting the “generally
accepted view” that the “representativeness” of the jury “enhances the jury’s political legitimacy
as a democratically inclusive institution”).
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racy in action.20
The most venerable feature of the jury is its ability to promote three
critical democratic values—trust, accountability, and legitimacy.  Juries foster
both the trust in government and accountability to the people necessary to
legitimize our representative democracy in the eyes of the citizenry.21 As
the only unelected branch of our federal government, the judicial branch is
considered more reliant on the trust reposed in it by the people than are the
elected branches of government, which are thought to replenish their
goodwill with each new election cycle.22  The judicial branch, therefore, is
more dependent on the appearance of legitimacy than are the executive or
legislative branches.23
The jury is the democratic capstone of our judicial system, most
prized for its unique ability to legitimize the otherwise politically unac-
countable decision-making of judges.24  Juries satisfy this need for demo-
20. See generally Carroll, supra note 18 and Amar, supra note 18. See also ABRAMSON, supra
note 17, at 125 (identifying a “representative deliberation” theory of democracy to describe the
jury’s role in our democracy).
21. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. at 411 (“The jury acts as a vital check against the wrongful
exercise of power by the State and its prosecutors. . . Jury selection is the primary means by
which a court may enforce a defendant’s right to be tried by a jury free from ethnic, racial or
political prejudice . . . or predisposition about the defendant’s culpability.”).  Elizabeth Anderson
observes that lack of political accountability by government to the people is incompatible with
the notion of democratic self-government. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTE-
GRATION 89, 92 (2010) (describing democracy as a mode of government by the people “carried
out by discussion among equals . . . [whose] point is to . . . realize this promise of universal and
equal standing . . . [through] a form of collective self-determination whereby those subject to
the laws are also in a relevant sense the authors of the laws.”). Nancy Sherer describes democratic
“legitimacy” as “a ‘reservoir’ of goodwill” or “long-term, deep-seated support for an institu-
tion . . . rather than short-term snapshots of an institution’s popularity.” Nancy Sherer, Diversify-
ing the Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy for the US Justice System Possible?, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
587, 625 (2011).  According to political scientist Danielle Allen, democratic disappointment aris-
ing from lack of consensus in political decision-making is inevitable in democracy. See ALLEN,
supra note 19, at 45-47.  Thus finding ways of fostering trust and legitimacy are critical to demo-
cratic survival. Id.
22. See Sherer, supra note 21, at 625.
23. Id. Sherer refers specifically to the federal judiciary, which is entirely appointed, but
her claims are equally applicable to states with judicial appointment systems. See Ciara Torres-
Spelliscy, Monique Chase and Emma Greenman, Improving Judicial Diversity, BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE at 6 (2010) (noting that the District of Columbia and 24 other states have appoin-
tive, rather than elective, state judicial systems). Even elected state judges may experience some
deficit of democratic legitimacy when they fail to reflect the diversity of the communities they
serve. See Brenda Wright, The Bench and the Ballot: Applying the Protections of the Voting Rights Act
to Judicial Elections 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669 (1991) (referring to a report of the Racial Ethnic
Bias Study Commission that concluded, “[t]he state simply cannot expect continued acceptance
of a judicial system in which minorities are virtually invisible in positions of decision-making and
responsibility.”).
24. For instance, this quest for judicial legitimacy, including efforts to both create and
preserve it, defines much of the Supreme Court’s separation of powers doctrine. Alexander
Bickel famously coined the phrase “the counter-majoritarian difficulty” to describe the tension
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cratic accountability by allowing ordinary citizens “the opportunity to
participate in making the justice of the community.”25  According to jury
scholar Jeffery Abramson, it is precisely this function of promoting demo-
cratic accountability to all constituent groups in the community that makes
racial diversity in particular a salient feature of the jury.26
Juries not only generate democratic accountability on behalf of the
people, they also foster needed trust in the judicial system.27  This trust is
indispensable to the effective functioning of our democracy.  Contrary to
some popular conceptions of democracy as government by consensus, po-
litical philosopher Danielle Allen explains that loss is inevitable in democ-
racy.28  The real project of democracy, therefore, is not to find consensus.
It is instead to first ensure that no group suffers continual losses, and then
to find a mechanism for individuals and groups to negotiate the loss of self-
interest that is inevitable in democracy.29  Allen suggests the best mecha-
nism for accomplishing these ends is to engender trust both among citizens
and between citizens and government.30  Trust between citizens guards
against the prospect of any group suffering continual losses by fostering “a
willingness to sacrifice some of one’s own power for the sake of common
agreement,”31  while trust between citizens and the government allows for
acceptance of the temporal losses that are inevitable in democracy.32  No-
where is the prospect of loss more inevitable than in the judicial system.33
When juries are representative of the communities they serve, they help
between the authority of judicial review by unelected judges and the theory of representative
democracy. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
25. Id. at 90-92.
26. Id. at 125. (“When the cross-sectional ideal is justified in terms of its ability to sell the
verdict, the representative jury is brought in line with the general theory of representative gov-
ernment.”)  In highlighting the importance of racial diversity in jury service, Abramson argues
that “the appearance of justice can[not] be delivered by a jury [ ] process that continually
underrepresents minorities.” Id. at 131.
27. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
28. ALLEN, supra note 19, at 37 (2004).  Allen relies on theories of democracy espoused by
Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant, Jurgen Habermas, and Plato in describing a presumption of
political consensus as characterizing democracy. See id. at 63.
29. Id. at 68.
30. Id. at 93.  Allen uses the analogy of friendship to describe the function “trust” plays in
stabilizing democracy.  She explains that “friendship’s basic act is reciprocity” and that it consists
“primarily of believing that others will not exploit one’s vulnerabilities, and that one’s agency is
generally secure, even when one cedes some elements of it to others.” Id. at 132.
31. William Eskridge also discusses the dangers posed when any group suffers continual
political losses in our democracy. William N. Eskridge Jr., A Pluralist Theory of the Equal Protection
Clause, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1239 (2009).  He describes the consequences of this “stakes
raising” as destabilizing for our democracy. Id.
32. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 93.
33. See discussion infra at 111 (describing how to mitigate loss by fostering trust).
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foster the trust necessary to legitimize our judicial system by securing the
consent of those governed by it.34
B. The Theory of Procedural Justice
The theory of procedural justice explains how representative juries
foster trust in the judicial system.  The theory posits that public percep-
tions of the legitimacy of our justice system turn less on the substance of
discrete decisions than on the perceived fairness of the procedural processes
employed in reaching those decisions.35  This hypothesis - that fair proce-
dures trump fair outcomes in shaping citizens’ perceptions of institutional
legitimacy - coincides with Allen’s thesis that if citizens trust the govern-
ment, they are more willing to accept the losses that are an inevitable fea-
ture of democracy.36  The theory of procedural justice has been confirmed
through a variety of empirical studies.37
In one revealing study, participants were shown video footage of po-
lice misconduct and told to evaluate the appropriateness of punitive action
against the police  based on the conduct observed using a scale of 1-3, with
1 being conduct least deserving of punishment and 3 being conduct most
deserving of punishment.38  The researchers found that regardless of the
lawfulness of the police conduct, the desire to punish was a full point
higher when respondents perceived the conduct as procedurally unfair
than when they perceived the conduct as procedurally fair.39  In fact, the
difference barely registered on the scale of 1-3 when looking at the lawful-
ness of the police conduct.40  Participants were no more likely to want to
punish unlawful conduct than to punish lawful conduct, but they were
much more likely to want to punish procedurally unfair conduct than they
34. ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 7 (“the jury remains the best tool for ensuring that the
law is being applied in a way that wins the people’s consent.”).
35. See Tom R. Tyler & Tracey Meares, Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Procedural
Justice, YALE L. J. FORUM, 525 (Mar. 2014). See also Sherer, supra note 21 at 625 (citing scholars
demonstrating empirically that “fair court procedures . . . lead to greater legitimacy for the
justice system”).  Although Sherer herself distinguishes between “procedural fairness” and the
kinds of “descriptive representation” reflected in calls for greater racial diversity within the judi-
ciary (whether among judges or on juries), ensuring that jurors represent a fair cross-section of
the community, including the racial diversity of the community, can itself be seen as promoting a
kind of procedural justice. Id.; see also Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effects of Fair
Decisionmaking Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28:4 L. & SOC’Y REV. 809-832 (1994);
ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 131.
36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful or
Effective Policing & Rightful Policing and Why It Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865 (2013).
38. Id.  Police are first responders in our justice system and their behavior is as salient in
legitimizing or delegitimizing our system of justice as is the behavior of judges or juries. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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were to punish procedurally fair conduct.41 In other words, people disap-
proved of bad processes far more than they disapproved of bad outcomes.
Studies show that fair processes not only increase faith in the legiti-
macy of judicial decision-making, they also increase citizens’ willingness to
accept the decisions of courts, to cooperate with them, and to otherwise
abide by the rule of law.42  In a 2002 study of 1,656 respondents who had
interactions with the justice system through either police officers or courts,
respondents’ perceptions of the fairness of the procedures employed by
these public decision-makers were more determinative of respondents’
willingness to accept the decision than was the favorability of the decision
itself.43
Tom Tyler and Tracey Meares explain that there are two key mea-
sures of procedural justice: (1) the quality of treatment of citizens by public
decision-makers, and (2) the quality of the decision-making itself.44  These
two measures can be seen as rough proxies for gauging trust and accountabil-
ity respectively.  A key determinant of the quality of treatment of citizens is
the extent to which citizens trust public decision-makers.45  Trust in this
regard is defined as a belief that the decision-maker is sincere and cares
about the effects of his or her conduct on citizens rather than acts out of
prejudice or disregard for citizens.46  One way to foster the trust in public
decision-makers that promotes a sense of procedural justice, particularly on
behalf of minority citizens, is to ensure that decision-makers themselves are
racially diverse in ways that reflect the communities they serve.47
C. The Importance of Racially Diverse Juries
Race has always figured prominently in our conception and con-
struction of the American jury system, which is often perceived as treating
minorities unfairly relative to Whites.48  For example, one study found
that a quarter of White respondents (25%) and more than three-quarters of
Black respondents (78%) said they believe the justice system treats Blacks
41. Id.
42. See e.g. Meares, supra note 37.
43. Id.
44. Tyler & Meares, supra note 35, at 537-538.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 104 (discussing how racial diversity improves the
quality of jury deliberation and decision-making).
48. Id. Studies have shown that Whites generally trust the justice system; whereas Blacks
generally distrust the justice system. Sara Sternberg Greene, Race, Class & Access to Civil Justice,
101 IOWA L. REV. 1263, 1277 (2016) (“Blacks are widely believed to view law enforcement and
other legal institutions with greater distrust than whites.”).  Often these negative perceptions of
the justice system by Black citizens is based on perceptions of discriminatory experiences with
the system. Id. at 1278.
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unfairly.49  Similarly, nearly half of White respondents (45%) and more
than four-fifths of Black respondents (84%) said they think the justice sys-
tem favors Whites over Blacks.50  This explains why, in the aftermath of
the now infamous 1992 trial of the White police officers caught on video-
tape brutally beating Rodney King (a Black motorist), nearly half of all
Black respondents (45%) described the acquittal of the White police of-
ficers by an all-White jury as “racist.”51
According to the theory of procedural justice, if we can foster trust in
the decision-maker (here the jury), and thereby improve perceptions of fair
treatment in the judicial process, we can also improve perceptions of judi-
cial legitimacy—notwithstanding the outcome in individual cases.52  One
way that we foster trust in the jury and improve perceptions of fair treat-
ment in the judicial process is by improving the racial diversity of juries.53
Studies show that perceptions of procedural fairness are significantly higher
when verdicts are rendered by racially diverse juries than when verdicts are
rendered by single-race juries.54  As one judge observed about juror diver-
sity, “[y]ou want . . . for this thing to not only be fair, but look fair.
Th[e] Court depends on people believing that you get a fair shake.”55
49. Nancy King, The Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confidence in the Fair-
ness of Jury Proceedings: An Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1177, 1184-1185 and 1194-
1195 (1994).
50. Id.
51. Id. This case was widely cited in the literature in support of critiques of all-White
juries and calls for racially diverse ones. See e.g. Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 19, at
44; Hiroshi Fukurai & Daryl Davies, Affirmative Action in Jury Selection: Racially Representative
Juries, Racial Quotas & Affirmative Juries of the Hennepin Model and the Jury De Mediate Linguae, 4
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y  L. 645, 646 (1997); King, supra note 49, at 1184.  Reflecting the same
concern in the converse, one scholar observed “no rebuke stings more than the concise state-
ment that ‘an all-White jury convicted a Black defendant.” Johnson & Fuentes-Rowher, supra
note 19, at 6.
52. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 COURT REV. 26, 35 (2009).  If,
however, judicial outcomes were consistently unfavorable to minority litigants, Allen suggests
that such continual losses would also erode trust in the legitimacy of the justice system as a
democratic institution. See supra notes 30-31.
53. See Samuel Sommers, On Racial and Group Decision-Making: Identifying Multiple Effects
of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90:4 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 597-612 (2016).
54. Sixty-seven percent of all respondents, seventy-five percent of Hispanic respondents,
and ninety-two percent of Black respondents agreed that “decisions reached by racially diverse
juries are fairer than decisions reached by single race juries.” See Fukurai & Davies, supra note 51,
at 664.
55. Ashish S. Joshi and Christian T. Kline, Lack of Jury Diversity: A National Problem with
Individual Consequences, ABA J. (2015).  Danielle Allen similarly describes this principle in rela-
tion to democratic decision-making more broadly when she explains that trust in fellow citizens
as public decision-makers “inspires . . . a consent-based regime with the flexibility needed to
garner from citizens of diverse backgrounds consent to decisions made in uncertainty.” ALLEN,
supra note 19, at 156.
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Increasing the racial diversity of jurors improves perceptions of the fairness,
and consequently the legitimacy, of the judicial system.56
In addition to fostering trust in the jury as the judicial decision-
maker, which is the first key measure of procedural justice, research shows
that ensuring racial diversity among jurors also improves the quality of de-
cision-making in jury deliberations.57  Thomas and Meares identify this as
the second key measure of procedural justice.58  Abramson offers an ac-
count of how increased racial diversity among jurors improves jury
deliberations.59
Abramson describes the task of the jury in discharging its democratic
function fully and competently to “represent accurately the diversity of
views held in a heterogeneous society such as the United States.”60  He
argues that racially diverse juries, unlike racially homogenous ones, pro-
mote three different democratic ideals: (1) epistemic diversity: a populist
claim about the collective wisdom of the people; (2) deliberative diversity: a
claim that many minds outsmart the few brightest minds; and (3) representa-
tive diversity: a claim that diversity of representation matters in a democ-
racy.61  Representative diversity fosters needed trust in the jury as judicial
decision-maker, but it is the epistemic and deliberative features of racially
diverse juries that improve the quality of decision-making, which also pro-
mote procedural justice.62
56. Id.
57. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing the two key measures of proce-
dural justice); see also ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 104. Abramson emphasizes that the delibera-
tive theory of the jury is not about pandering to group interests by highlighting or exploiting
individual prejudices, but about leveraging epistemic diversity to improve jury deliberations. Id.
58. See Thomas & Meares, supra note 35, at 537.
59. ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 104.
60. Id. at 101.  Elizabeth Anderson describes this as epistemic diversity. ANDERSON, supra
note 21, at 151.  She too distinguishes between the underlying differences in cultural and social
experiences that contribute to the diversity of perspectives that make for improved jury delibera-
tions and mere differences in race and/or ethnicity among jurors. Id.
61. Jeffery Abramson, Four Models of Jury Democracy, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861, 883
(2015).  In explaining the optimal functioning of the jury and the necessity of cross-sectional
representation, Abramson offers a deliberative theory of the jury that relies on Aristotle’s asser-
tion that “democracy’s chief virtue [i]s the way it permit[s] ordinary persons drawn from differ-
ent walks of life to achieve a ‘collective wisdom’ that none could achieve alone.” Id. at 104.
Abramson argues that the jury is the “last, best refuge of this connection among democracy,
deliberation, and the achievement of wisdom by ordinary persons.” Id. See also ALLEN, supra
note 19, at 135 (similarly relying on Aristotle’s claims of deliberation and consent to inform
democratic engagement among citizens).
62. The representative function of juries is particularly important for racial minorities
who have experienced both de jure and de facto discrimination in so many domains of public life.
See Marder, supra note 18, at 661 (observing that “[s]erving on a jury and voting . . . takes on
special meaning for those members of society, such as African-American men and all women,
who were long excluded from jury service, first by law and then by practice. . .”).
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The accountability hypothesis helps explain how the deliberative and
epistemic features of diverse juries improve the quality of jury delibera-
tions.63  The accountability hypothesis posits that when working groups
are composed of diverse members, participants have to justify their ideas to
a wider range of people and therefore must display more thought and care
in their consideration.64 Recent jury studies by psychologist Samuel Som-
mers confirm the accountability hypothesis, finding that racially diverse
juries do a better job than racially homogenous ones of keeping racial
prejudices in check in particular, and also of deliberating generally.65
Sommers finds that the more mixed the racial composition of the jury: (1)
the less likely White jurors are to express guilty preferences in advance of
jury deliberations, and (2) the greater the information exchange among
jurors during deliberations.66 According to Sommers, relative to racially
homogenous juries, racially diverse juries:67
• deliberated longer (50.67 minutes vs. 38.49 minutes)
• discussed more case facts (30.48 vs.  25.93),
• committed less factual inaccuracies (4.14 vs. 7.28),
• left fewer inaccurate statements uncorrected (1.36 vs. 2.49),
• cited to more pieces of evidence they considered missing
(1.87 vs. 1.07),
• raised a greater number of race-related issues (3.79 vs. 2.07),
• made more mentions of racism (1.35 vs. 0.93),
• had fewer objections when racism was mentioned as rele-
vant (22% of the time vs. 100% of the time).
63. See ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 130 (describing the accountability hypothesis).
64. Id. Notably, expressing care also reflects the quality of treatment that fosters trust in
the decision-maker and satisfies the first measure of procedural justice. See supra note 44 and
accompanying text.
65. Sommers, supra note 53, at 608.  Abramson similarly observes that “research indicates
that ‘when jurors of different ethnic groups deliberate together, they are better able to overcome
their biases.” ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 104. Elizabeth Anderson provides support for the
notion that racial diversity among jurors may contribute to improved deliberation by relying on
theories of cognitive psychology, explaining that “[c]ognitive biases tend to kick in when peo-
ple need to make decisions under time pressure, when they are tired, distracted, cognitively
overloaded, or under stress and when a nondiscriminatory rationale for their decision is readily
available.  They are better able to consciously check their biases when they know they are being
observed, are held accountable for their decisions, are reminded of nondiscriminatory norms, are
given ample time to deliberate, and make evaluations on the basis of objectively measured crite-
ria rather than subjective impressions.” ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 50.  This conclusion is also
bolstered by the business management literature demonstrating that diverse teams, including
those reflecting broad racial diversity, are better problem solvers than heterogeneous teams. See
generally SCOTT PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE (2007).
66. Sommers, supra note 53, at 608.
67. Id.
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In other words, racially diverse juries displayed more care and less prejudice
in their deliberations.  This means that not only is the deliberative process
itself improved when juries are more racially diverse, but this enhanced
deliberation reinforces precisely the qualities that, according to the theory
of procedural justice, engender trust in the decision-maker.68
Abramson’s claim about the jury embodying principles of demo-
cratic equality by ensuring that all groups are effectively represented in the
deliberative process actually has historic roots dating back to colonial En-
gland.69  The jury “de medietate linguae,” which translates to “jury of the
half tongue,” was first used in twelfth century England in cases involving
Jews, but evolved to accommodate cases involving any foreign party.70
The jury “de medietate linguae” required that half of all jurors represent
the minority interest in any litigation involving the adjudication of minor-
ity rights.71  The jury “de medietate linguae” was an acknowledgment that
“prejudice existed against the minority group and that an ordinary jury
would not necessarily produce a fair result.”72  As with so many other
aspects of English common law, this practice was eventually adopted in the
early American jury system in cases involving a minority party interest.73
By 1968, the Jury Selection & Service Act codified this commitment
to democratic equality in jury selection and service, including, specifically,
a commitment to racial diversity among jurors, by expressly identifying the
purpose of jury selection as “achieving proportionate representation on the
jury rolls for all ‘distinct’ or ‘cognizable’ groups in the community,” de-
fined to include (among other things) proportionate representation of ra-
cial minorities.74  The Jury Selection and Service Act, and the fair cross-
section requirement it established, have become the constitutional baseline
for the guarantee of equal protection in jury selection and service in both
federal and state courts.75  As a result, numerous federal, state, and local
courts have adopted efforts deliberately designed to improve racial diversity
in jury selection and service.76
68. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Marder, supra note 18 (similarly
concluding that cultural diversity on juries generates epistemic and deliberative benefits for jury
deliberations).
69. ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 106; see also Fukurai & Davies, supra note 51, at 654-
657.




74. See ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 117.  Prior to 1968, federal juries were composed of
“men of recognized intelligence and probity” within the community, but this more elitist jury
selection system was abandoned for a more democratic system reflective of a “fair cross-section of
the community.” Id. at 99-100.
75. See id. at 118.
76. Nancy King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirmative
Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 708 (1993) (“Practically unnoticed, a growing
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Hennepin County, MN, for instance, employs a race-conscious se-
lection system for grand juries that requires the composition of the 23-
member grand jury to mirror the racial composition of the County as
determined by the most recent census.77  The system provides detailed
procedures for calling successive jurors from the jury pool until the re-
quired racial composition is reached among grand jurors.78 There are also a
number of State and Local Court Commissions and Task Forces charged
with developing procedures for ensuring that jury selection and service
appropriately reflect the racial diversity of the communities from which
jurors are drawn.79  The federal judiciary has adopted similar efforts.80
In addition to these more formal processes,, individual judges have
also taken steps to promote jury diversity.  For example, in the Northern
District of Illinois, which encompasses Chicago, Judge Milton Shadur ad-
journed a trial until a multi-racial jury appropriately representative of the
community could be summoned.81  The Third Circuit affirmed similar
efforts by Judge Ramseur of the Federal District Court in New Jersey to
ensure that the jury reflected a cross-section of the community.82 These
number of courts are using race to select jurors . . . to increase the representation of minorities
on jury pools to [ ] duplicate or surpass their percentages in local populations.”); see generally
Albert W. Alschuler, Racial and Ethnic Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L. J. 704 (1995) (discussing
the jury de mediate linguae, the Hennepin County, MN grand jury model, and other courts that
employ racial and ethnic quotas in jury selection); see also Jury Selection & Composition, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 1443 (1997); Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race Diversity & Jury Composition:
Battering & Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1050 (2003).  For examples of the
types of efforts being undertaken by courts, see, e.g., Federal Diversity & Inclusion Strategic Plan
2016; Final Report of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee on Racial and Gender Bias in the
Justice System.
77. See Fukurai & Davies, supra note 51, at 658.  Based on then available census data
reflecting a nine percent total minority population in Hennepin County, at least two members of
every 23-member grand jury empaneled had to be racial and ethnic minorities. Id.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Final Report of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee on Racial and Gender
Bias in the Justice System; see also Wright, supra note 23 (detailing the report of the Florida Su-
preme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission to improve jury diversity).
80. Goal 5.2.c of the 2015 Strategic Plan for the Federal Judicial Center, which is the adminis-
trative arm of the federal court system, is to “improve the extent to which juries are representa-
tive of the communities in which they serve.” Id.
81. See Joshi and Kline, supra note 55; see also Annie Sweeney % Cynthia Dizikes, The
Balancing Act of Jury Selection, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 27, 2013 (describing the same incident
and efforts more generally to improve racial diversity among jurors).
82. In defending his actions, Judge Ramseur explained that he was “trying to get a cross-
section . . . [by] deliberately trying to get an even mix of people from background and races,
and things like that.”  Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1217, 1229 and 1236 (3rd Cir. 1992), cert.
denied 113 S. Ct. 2433 (1993) (finding race-conscious selection of grand jurors may be “objec-
tionable” or “ill-conceived” but not unconstitutional where motivated neither by a desire to
purposefully discriminate, nor to limit service by African American jurors, but instead by desire
to achieve cross-section on jury). Compare Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) (finding equal
protection violation where jury commissioner purposefully limited the number of African
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race-conscious efforts by judges, jury commissioners, and others affirm the
importance of ensuring diversity in jury selection and service as a function
of our constitutional commitment to democratic equality.83
D. The Equal Protection Jurisprudence of Jury Selection
The Equal Protection Clause is the provision of our Constitution
that guarantees all citizens equal treatment under the law.84  It has been the
constitutional provision most responsible for redressing racial discrimina-
tion throughout our nation’s history.85  For nearly a century after the
Equal Protection Clause was ratified, however, it did little to protect peo-
ple of color (particularly the newly emancipated slaves) from racial dis-
crimination as intended, with one notable exception—the jury box.86
Because of their unique ability to help legitimize our democracy by foster-
ing trust and accountability on behalf of the judicial branch, juries have
received special consideration in our constitutional equal protection juris-
prudence.87  Cases adjudicating equal protection challenges in jury selec-
tion and service have acknowledged the intersecting principles of
representative democracy and equal protection embodied by the jury.88
Indeed the very first successful challenge under the newly ratified Equal
Protection Clause was a challenge to racial exclusion in jury selection.89
American jurors to one to achieve proportionate representation of the community.). But cf Com-
monwealth v. Doss, 510 S.W.3d 830 (Ky. 2016) (finding judge who discharged jury in criminal
trial of Black defendant because no Blacks were seated on the petit jury violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
83. See discussion supra Section I.C.
84. U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
85. Cases include Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
86. During this period, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously called the Equal Protec-
tion Clause the constitutional provision of “last resort.”  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
87. See Alschuler, supra note 76, at 717 (“The Supreme Court has recognized that the
importance of representative juries justifies a departure from the standards employed in equal
protection litigation . . . It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of
public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community.”) (internal citations
omitted); see also Jessica Heyman, Introducing the Jury Exception: How Equal Protection Treats Juries
Differently, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 185, 185-186 (2013) (arguing generally that the
Supreme Court cases on race in jury service diverge substantially from the rest of the Court’s
Equal Protection jurisprudence, describing it as “emphatically the most protected area of Equal
Protection jurisprudence.”).
88. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
89. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).  The first challenge decided by the
Supreme Court under the Equal Protection Clause was The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1873), but that challenge by a group of butchers to a state-sponsored monopoly in the slaugh-
tering industry in the city of New Orleans was unsuccessful.
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In Strauder v. West Virginia, a Black criminal defendant challenged a
West Virginia statute excluding Black persons from jury service.90  The
Supreme Court declared that the statutory exclusion from jury service on
the basis of race evinced precisely the kind of racial prejudice the newly
ratified Equal Protection Clause was designed to redress.91  More troubling
than the overt racial exclusion, the Court observed, was the fact that it
occurred in the jury context, which by its very design is intended to secure
the individual liberty emblematic of our representative democracy through
its composition of “the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is
selected or summoned to determine.”92  The Court expressly held that
“compelling a colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn
from a panel from which the State has expressly excluded every man of his
race,” is undoubtedly a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.93
After Strauder, jury cases became unique in the Court’s equal protec-
tion jurisprudence.94  During a time when the “separate but equal” doc-
trine prevailed to authorize racial segregation in almost every domain of
public life, the jury was a notable exception.95 The Court continued to
enforce the guarantee of equal protection in jury service in ways that di-
verged from the Court’s more general equal protection jurisprudence,
thereby signaling the unique importance of racial equality in jury service.96
Unlike the jury “de medietate linguae,” the Court did not mandate that
Blacks be seated on juries involving Black defendants as a matter of equal
protection law,97 but in Norris v. Alabama, the Court extended the protec-
tion from “total statutory exclusion” as recognized in Strauder, to “system-
atic and arbitrary exclusion” in the selection of persons called for jury
service.98  Further, rather than requiring direct evidence of discriminatory
intent, the Court accepted “statistical disparities between Blacks eligible to
serve and those actually called” as proof of unlawful discrimination under
90. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304.
91. Id. at 308.
92. Id. at 309.
93. Id.
94. See Heyman, supra note 87.
95. See id.
96. For a discussion of the cases addressing the issue of racial diversity in jury service from
Strauder v. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) to Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), see ABRAM-
SON, supra note 17, at 105-139.
97. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880).  For a fuller discussion of Rives, see ABRAM-
SON, supra note 17, at 105-107.
98. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 588 (1935).  This case involved an appeal by the
famous Scottsboro Boys, who were five Black defendants accused a raping a white woman and
then convicted by an all-White jury. See ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 111 (discussing the Norris
case and describing the trial of the Scottsboro boys, along with the trial of the men accused of
lynching Emmitt Till, as the most infamous cases of the jury effectuating a grave miscarriage of
justice and, as sociologist Gunnar Myrdal described, embodying a form of “extreme democracy”
that favors only the interests of the majority).
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the equal protection clause.99  This particular line of jury discrimination
cases culminated in Smith v. Texas,100 in which the Court first acknowl-
edged the “need to make the jury a ‘body truly representative of the com-
munity.’ ”101  This acknowledgement expressed a requirement for racial
diversity among jurors in principle, but the selection of jurors for trial
continued to reflect racialized exclusion in practice.102
Then, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court went beyond scrutinizing
rules designed to include Blacks on juries in principle to address the perni-
cious and discriminatory effects of more covert practices intended to ex-
clude Blacks from jury service in  practice.103 In Batson, a Black criminal
defendant challenged the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes to remove
all of the Black prospective jurors from the jury venire, resulting in the
defendant’s conviction by an all-White petit jury.104  Batson argued these
race-based peremptory strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause.105
Addressing the ways in which both principles of equal protection and rep-
resentative democracy were implicated in the case, the Batson Court
observed:
The very idea of a jury is a body . . . composed of the peers or
equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to
determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons
having the same legal status in society as that which he holds
. . .The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends be-
yond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to
touch the entire community.106
The Court specifically referenced judicial reliance on the public trust re-
posed in the court for its legitimacy, and the way in which the racial exclu-
sion of jurors undermined that public trust.  Echoing the theory of
procedural justice and its emphasis on fair process, the Court reasoned:
Selection procedures that purposefully exclude Black persons
from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our
system of justice . . . Discrimination within the judicial system
is most pernicious because it is ‘a stimulant to that race
99. See Heyman, supra note 87, at 237, 239.  This can be contrasted with the ruling in
Plessy v. Ferguson in which the Court announced the “separate but equal” doctrine, finding that
state-sponsored segregation was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  163 U.S. 537
(1896).
100. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
101. See ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 115.
102. See id.
103. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
104. Id. at 83.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 86-88.
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prejudice which is an impediment to securing to [Black citi-
zens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all
others.107
In finding for the Black defendant and prohibiting a prosecutor’s use of
peremptory strikes to remove jurors from the jury venire on the basis of
their race, the Batson Court explained how its decision legitimized the
justice system and even the rule of law itself:
By requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the racially discrimi-
natory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the
mandate of equal protection and furthers the ends of justice.  In
view of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public
respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will
be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from
jury service because of his race.108
The Supreme Court in Batson declared the covert efforts to exclude
Blacks from jury service through the use of peremptory strikes just as in-
compatible with the equal protection  guarantee of racial non-discrimina-
tion in jury selection as the overt exclusion in Strauder.109  Moreover, the
Court in Batson ruled that the prosecution could no longer rely on the
presumption of non-discrimination that had prevailed in these cases, but
instead required the prosecution to “articulate a neutral explanation related
to the particular case to be tried” for peremptorily striking each potential
juror.110  The Court specifically cautioned trial judges to be aware of and
sensitive to the potential for peremptory strikes to mask discriminatory
treatment when evaluating whether purposeful discrimination had
occurred.111
This line of cases, with Batson at its center, provided unparalleled
substantive and procedural protections against racial discrimination in the
107. Id.
108. Id. at 99; see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (refusing to allow
even a criminal defendant to engage in race-based exclusion of jurors because of concerns for
democratic legitimacy).
109. Applying the “systematic exclusion” standard first announced in Norris, the Court
went further still in finding that such “systematic exclusion” on the basis of race need not be
demonstrated through a pattern of conduct spanning multiple cases, but can be demonstrated by
proof of conduct raising an inference of discrimination solely in the pattern of striking jurors in
the defendant’s own case. Batson, 476 U.S. 79.  This standard has been continually affirmed in
subsequent cases. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (finding proof of “system-
atic exclusion” of Mexicans from jury service); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972)
(finding systematic exclusion of Blacks from jury service).
110. The standard providing for a presumption of non-discrimination on the part of the
prosecution arose in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
111. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99.
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jury context.112  For this reason, the decision in Batson is considered a
cornerstone of the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence sur-
rounding jury selection.113  The treatment of Batson in the scholarly litera-
ture is extensive and cannot be fully summarized here, but there is general
consensus about the import of Batson for both equal protection doctrine
and democratic theory.114  This acknowledgment was made more explicit
112. Despite its notable impact, Batson has not proven to be a panacea.  Both scholars and
practitioners alike have questioned the efficacy of Batson, and the constitutional standards it es-
tablished, for ensuring that juries adequately reflect the racial diversity of the communities they
serve. See, e.g., Tania Tetlow, Solving Batson, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1859 (2015) (critiquing
the Court’s focus on procedural fairness in jury selection rather than on the constitutional rights
of criminal defendants); Jeannine Bell and Mona Lynch, Cross-Sectional Challenges: Gender, Race
and Six-Person Juries, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 419 (2016) (identifying ongoing challenges to
achieving cross-sectional juries, particularly among six-person juries); Ellis & Diamond, supra
note 76, at 1058 (acknowledging ongoing challenges to jury diversity “despite Batson and its
progeny”).
113. The scholarly literature on Batson fills volumes in no small part because of its impact in
shifting the doctrinal terrain of constitutional law in ways that have moved us materially closer to
realizing the guarantee of racial equality in one particular domain of public life - jury service. For
instance, there have been numerous symposia dedicating whole volumes to discussion and analy-
sis of Batson v. Kentucky and/or its implications for juries. See, e.g., Symposium: Batson at Twenty-
Five: Perspectives on the Landmark, Reflections on Its Legacy, IOWA L. REV. (2012); The Civil Jury as
a Political Institution Symposium, WM. & MARY L. REV. (2014); Jury and Lay Participation: Ameri-
can Perspective and Global Trend, CHIC.-KENT L. REV. (2015); Symposium: The Jury at a Crossroad:
The American Experience, II. The Jury and Race, CHIC.-KENT L. REV. (2003); AM. CRIM. L. REV.
(1994).
114. See, e.g., Carroll, The Jury As Democracy, supra note 18 (arguing for alternate concep-
tions of jury selection based on satisfying both its democratic and representative functions);
Christina S. Carbone & Victoria C. Plaut, Diversity and the Civil Jury, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
837 (2014) (arguing for the importance of the civil jury as a form of democratic participation
and the necessity of racial diversity to achieve the goal of legitimacy); Melynda J. Price, Policing
the Borders of Democracy: The Continuing Role of Batson in Protecting the Citizenship Rights of the
Excluded, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1635,  1637, 1643 (2012) (describing the jury box as “critical and
negotiated democratic space” and further noting “discussions of the role of the jury in represen-
tative democracy provided many political trees in the forest of legal issues regarding . . . the
prevention of racial discrimination [in jury selection].”); Marder, supra note 18 (observing that
the jury performs many “populist” functions, among them fostering legitimacy in government
among citizens, a function which is best served when the jury is representative of the citizenry);
Jury Selection and Composition, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1443 (1997) (identifying the jury as a forum
for democratic participation, as much as the administration of law/justice, and arguing for greater
racial diversity in jury service to further these dual roles); Amar, supra note 18 (arguing that
because of the political nature of jury service, the right of racial minorities to equal participation
is best protected as a voting right rather than under the equal protection clause); Phoebe Had-
don, Does Grutter Offer Courts An Opportunity to Consider Race in Jury Selection and Decisions Re-
lated to Promoting Fairness in the Deliberation Process?, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 547
(2004) (arguing for reconception of the jury to better accomplish the goal of the jury as an
embodiment of principles of both democracy and equality); King, supra note 49 (arguing for the
defensibility of affirmative action in jury selection under equal protection doctrine based on the
compelling interest in furthering democratic legitimacy on behalf of the judiciary). See also Al-
schuler, supra note 76 (also arguing for affirmative race-consciousness in jury selection based both
on principles of equal protection and democratic participation).
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in Powers v. Ohio, where the Court went further still in emphasizing the
point that racial equality in jury service is about protecting the right of
democratic participation by jurors themselves and preserving the legitimacy
of the judicial process.115  Relying on the holding of Batson, the Court in
Powers held that it is not only a violation of the defendant’s equal protec-
tion rights to exclude jurors on the basis of their race, but a violation of the
excluded juror’s constitutional rights not to be removed from the jury on
the basis of her race.116  Reiterating the importance of jury diversity to
judicial legitimacy, the Court expressly reasoned that denying individuals
participation in jury service on the basis of race “casts doubt on the integ-
rity of the judicial process” itself.117
Even today, the Supreme Court is still scrutinizing claims of racial
discrimination in jury selection and service with great concern for consid-
erations of procedural justice.118 The Court’s emphasis in these cases, not
just on equal protection but also on preserving public respect for both the
judicial system and the rule of law, can be understood as expressing con-
cern for fostering the trust and ensuring the accountability to the citizenry
that are necessary to preserve the legitimacy of the judicial system.119
115. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“Jury service preserves the democratic
element of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of the
laws by all of the people . . . for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most
significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.”).
116. Id. Despite the fact that the defendant in Powers was White and the excluded jurors
were Black, the Court reasoned that the defendant had standing to litigate this third-party claim
on behalf of the excluded juror(s). Id. at 413 (“Both the excluded juror and the criminal defen-
dant have a common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom . . . This
congruence of interests makes it necessary and appropriate for the defendant to raise the rights of
the juror.”).
117. Id. at 412 (observing that racial discrimination in jury selection “invites cynicism re-
specting the jury’s neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the law” and even “casts doubt” over
the entire proceeding). Acknowledging the racialized dimension of the concern for judicial trust
and legitimacy, the Court observed that this “cynicism may be aggravated if race is implicated in
the trial, either in a direct way . . . or some more subtle manner . . .” Id.
118. In 2016, the Court overturned the criminal conviction of a Black defendant where
the prosecution exercised its peremptory strikes to exclude all of the qualified Black venire-
persons from the jury, leaving the defendant to be convicted by an all-White jury. Foster v.
Chatman, 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).  Last term, in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the
Court again overturned a defendant’s jury verdict, this time because a juror admitted making
racially biased statements during jury deliberations. 580 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).  In
both cases the Court emphasized the importance of ensuring that jury trials are not tainted by
racial discrimination, which the Court said “implicates unique historical, constitutional, and
institutional concerns” and denies the guarantee of equality central to the effective functioning of
our democracy. Id. at 21 (slip op.).
119. As the Court reasoned in Powers, “[t]he purpose of the jury system is to impress upon
the [ ] defendant and the community as a whole that a verdict . . . is given in accordance with
the law by persons who are fair.  The verdict will not be accepted or understood in these terms if
the jury is chosen by unlawful means. . . [that] excludes jurors . . . on account of race.” 499
U.S. at 413.
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The Supreme Court’s opinions in Batson and its progeny, as well as
the scholarly literature analyzing Batson, identify two key reasons why this
case, and the goal of racial diversity in jury service that it promotes, are
considered so significant in our constitutional equal protection canon.
The first is the unique role that juries occupy in our system of representa-
tive democracy, serving as a means to foster both trust and accountability
on behalf of the judiciary as the least democratic branch of government.120
The second is the overriding importance of racial diversity to the effective
democratic functioning of the jury itself.121  If we wager so much on juries
precisely because they epitomize our ideals for democratic equality, then
how we think about and treat juries ought to inform how we manage
other aspects of our judicial system, as well as civic institutions more
broadly.
II. ENSURING DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY IN THE JUDICIARY, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
If the jury is considered an exemplar of our representative democ-
racy, it follows that how we conceive of and administer the jury system
should inform our approach to other key sites of civic participation in our
representative democracy.122  In other words, Batson is grounded in a doc-
trine of racial equality and principles of participatory democracy that tran-
scend the jury context.123  The most obvious extension of Batson is to the
bench, where judges perform a civic function equivalent to juries in our
judicial system.124  But there is no reason to limit application of the de-
mocratizing principles embodied in Batson to the judiciary.
There are other equally significant domains of our representative de-
mocracy where the key insights of procedural justice theory ought to simi-
larly apply and where key public decision-makers ought to equally reflect
the racial diversity of the communities they serve.125  The two additional
domains suggested here are law enforcement and public education.  These
domains are suggested not because they are the only other domains of our
civic life that lend themselves to application of these doctrinal and demo-
cratic principles, but because, for several reasons, they have unique signifi-
cance for the enhanced democratic legitimacy that will accrue if public
120. See supra Section I.A.
121. See supra Section I.C.
122. See supra note 35 and accompanying (discussing the theory of procedural justice).
123. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
124. Judges today perform many judicial functions that were once within the purview of
the jury. See ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 75-77.  There is already a fair amount of consensus
around the claim for greater judicial diversity. See, e.g., Johnson & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note
19, at 45 (citing sources ranging from Chief Justice William Rehnquist to the American Bar
Association, “broad agreement exists that there is a pressing need for a diverse judiciary.”).
125. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of procedural justice).
22 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 23:1
decision-makers in these domains better reflect the diversity of the com-
munities they serve.126
First, these are domains where we are presently experiencing a crisis
of democratic legitimacy, particularly on behalf of minority citizens, as
acutely reflected in the “school to prison pipeline” phenomenon.127  Sec-
ond, and perhaps because of these dire circumstances, these domains have
been the subject of extensive research and study and so lend themselves to
greater empirical analysis of the effects of increased diversity on these do-
mains.128  Finally, each is a domain where scholars have already made calls
for increased racial diversity, and so there is precedent for the race-con-
scious approach advocated for here.129  However, the focus here on these
three domains should not suggest any limitation on future attempts to ex-
pand the scope of the democratic equality principles embodied in Batson
even further.130
Political philosopher Elizabeth Anderson has similarly called for ex-
tension of the principle of democratic equality from the jury to democracy
more broadly.131  She suggests that, much like racially homogenous juries,
our present system of democracy, with its long history of racial exclusion
and segregation, lacks the requisite accountability to racial minorities needed
to foster democratic legitimacy.132  This history has resulted in public de-
cision-makers who are overwhelmingly White and who lack effective ac-
126. See infra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
127. See Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for Change, 48 ARIZ.
ST. L. J. 313 (2016).
128. See infra Section II.B.
129. See infra notes 146 and 148.  It might seem that given these considerations, prosecu-
tors would be a likely target of consideration here. See, e.g., Justice For All, www.wholeads.us/
justice (citing the abysmal statistics on the demographic diversity of elected state prosecutors
across the country). However, the justice system is already well-represented in this analysis by the
inclusion of both police (front-line enforcers) and judges (with final enforcement authority), and
so prosecutors seem an unnecessary target.  Additionally, given the focus specifically on the
“school to prison pipeline,” it seems appropriate to forego treatment of prosecutors in this analy-
sis in favor of teachers.  Finally, there simply has not been as much research on and scholarship
produced about the effects of increased racial diversity among prosecutors to permit their inclu-
sion here.
130. Abramson, for instance, connects the debate over racial equality in jury service to
other democratic domains such as “schools, police forces and elected and appointed offices.”
ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 102. See also id. at 127 (“these issues . . . are ones that Americans
fiercely debate elsewhere, in school assignments, affirmative action programs, and . . . minority
voting districts.”).  Allen defines our democracy as “[a] host of publicly binding decisions . . .
[that] arise from public institutions like schools, churches, media outlets, and businesses.” AL-
LEN, supra note 19, at 168-169.
131. See ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 102.
132. Id.
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countability to minority citizens.133  Such a lack of political accountability
is inherently incompatible with the idea of representative democracy that
informs our commitment to democratic equality.134  According to Ander-
son, if we are to enforce our aspirational norms of democratic equality, as
well as ensure trust and foster accountability in our democratic institutions,
we must seek greater racial diversity among public decision-makers across
all relevant domains of our civic life.135  If we understand our aspirations
for democracy as a form of “collective self-determination whereby those
subject to the laws are also in a relevant sense the authors of the law,” then
the imperative of racial diversity within the key sites of our democracy and
in particular among key public decision-makers is made evident.136  Al-
though Anderson cautions that the pursuit of representative democracy
should not devolve into identity politics, she does advocate for greater ra-
cial diversity among our civic leaders.137
133. Id. (“[E]lites—those with official decision-making power over others—are over-
whelmingly composed of a closed social group . . . th[at] effectively escape[s] accountability for
the impact of their decisions on [minority racial] groups.”).
134. Anderson expressly describes our democracy as a government in which the political
rights inhering in all citizens include the right to participate fully and equally in government
through the following acts: “to vote, assemble for political purposes, hold political office and
serve on juries.” ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 90.
135. Anderson concludes that “democratic equality requires not just that [political] offices
be realistically open on fair terms to all groups . . ., but that they actually be filled by members of
all the relevant groups, such that offices are fully integrated, with members of different groups
working together on terms of equality.” Id. at 110. See also id. at 109  (“[political] offices [must]
be occupied by members of different groups . . . [and] competent elites must be composed of
people from all walks of life, including all significantly segregated groups.”).  This sentiment
seems to mirror Justice O’Connor’s recognition in Grutter that in order for our democracy to be
legitimate in the eyes of minority citizens, the path to civic leadership must be “visibly open to
talented and qualified individuals from every race and ethnicity. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 325 (2003). Anderson argues that “under conditions of racial segregation, elites composed
overwhelmingly of Whites cannot be trusted to formulate policies concerning Blacks or any
other racially isolated group .  . . that are equally responsive to their interests.” ANDERSON, supra
note 21, at 110.  Anderson explains this lack of accountability on behalf of majority civic leaders
to minority citizens by observing, for instance, that “[w]hen the target of policy is implicitly or
explicitly coded Black, the policy response is harsh and punitive; when the target is coded
White . . . the policy response is sympathetic.” Id. at 62.
136. ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 92. This process of “collective self-determination” is
consistent with Allen’s claim that democracy requires reciprocity where, in the process of gov-
erning, individual citizens trust that “one’s agency is generally secure, even when one cedes
some elements of it to others.” ALLEN, supra note 19, at 132.
137. Anderson warns that “racial identity politics” fosters continued segregation that pro-
motes neither justice nor democracy and urges investment in a collective rather than narrow
racial identity. ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 110.  I am not convinced that racial identity politics
are as troublesome as Anderson suggests to our democratic aspirations. See generally Osamudia
James, Valuing Identity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 127 (2017). I do, however, concede her point, which
echoes Allen’s, that the effective functioning of our democracy requires that we cultivate trust
among citizens and between citizens and government and that any threat to this mutual trust
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Anderson emphasizes the importance of racial diversity among
elected officials, but the public decision-making that implicates the need
for fostering democratic trust and accountability is not confined to electo-
ral politics.138  Public deliberations occur across a broad range of civic in-
stitutions and by a host of different public decision-makers, which Allen
describes as “the parochialness of law and representation” in our democ-
racy.139  Accordingly, participation in each public domain of our civic life,
as well as all decision-making by public servants, ought to equally reflect
this commitment to fostering democratic trust and accountability.140  In
broadly conceiving of the opportunities for our representative democracy
to live up to its commitment to democratic equality, most notably embod-
ied in our constitutional jury jurisprudence as signified by Batson, I turn
now to these other domains of our political life as models for Batson’s ready
application.
A. Judging, Policing, and Teaching as Key Sites of Civic Participation
Legal scholars have in part acknowledged application of the demo-
cratic equality principles embodied in Batson to judges.141  Sylvia Lazos
Vargas, for instance, makes the case for racial diversity among judges by
drawing on John Hart Ely’s famous representation reinforcement the-
ory.142  Vargas explains how equal protection law operates to both guaran-
tee equal participation and reinforce notions of democratic representation
on behalf of racial minorities.143  Like Allen, Vargas argues that the trust
generated on behalf of minority citizens when judges reflect the racial di-
poses a threat to the legitimacy and long-term stability of our democracy. ALLEN, supra note 19,
at 37.
138. ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 109.
139. Allen argues for broadly construing the sites and moments of political participation by
arguing: “The bills of federal and state legislatures are not the only laws that structure life.  A host
of publicly binding decisions . . . arise from public institutions like schools, churches, media
outlets, and businesses to set the terms of our cohabitation.  Political representation occurs not
merely when Congress-folk gather. . . Our participation in assorted institutions .  . . shapes our
political world . . . [reflects an] understanding of the parochialness of law and representation.”
ALLEN, supra note 19, at 168-169.
140. Although Allen does not expressly identify courts and/or juries in particular as rele-
vant sites of civic participation, she does imply their relevance in this regard. Id. at 78. (citing
Thomas Hobbes for the principle that, “[i]n a democracy. . . the court is the people.”).
141. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Does A Diverse Judiciary Attain A Rule Of Law That Is Inclusive?:
What Grutter v. Bollinger Has To Say About Diversity On The Bench, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 101
(2004-2005).
142. Id. at 139.  This theory defends Chief Justice Earl Warren’s activist equal protection
jurisprudence during the Civil Rights Era. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
143. Vargas, supra note 141, at 139.
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versity of the citizenry legitimizes and stabilizes our democracy by dif-
fusing racial tensions.144
Acknowledgments of the democratic equality benefits of greater ra-
cial diversity among police officers and teachers also exist in the social
science literature.145  Relying on studies demonstrating the material bene-
fits that accrue to communities of color from greater racial diversity among
law enforcement (and conversely the harms that can occur when an all-
White force polices minority communities), scholars have called for in-
creased racial diversity among police officers.146  Law enforcement itself
has long defended efforts to increase racial diversity within their own ranks
on the ground that such racial diversity is vital to their ability to engender
trust with minority communities and ultimately to legitimize law enforce-
ment in the eyes of minority citizens.147  Similar calls for increased racial
diversity among teachers can be found both in the educational literature148
and among school districts themselves.149
Although scholars have sometimes defended calls for greater racial
diversity among judges, police officers, and teachers on the basis of in-
creased perceptions of institutional legitimacy, they have not generally
grounded their observations or arguments in the equal protection princi-
ples expressed in Batson and its progeny.150 Thus, the literature has not
144. Id. at 141-142.  (“[i]nclusive judging provides a reason for minority citizens to con-
tinue to trust key governmental institutions and believe they are neutral rather than political . . .
Trust that institutions can function capably and inclusively is part of what makes it possible for
democratic societies to diffuse racial identity-based conflicts and keep them at tolerable levels.”).
145. See infra notes 146 and 148.
146. See, e.g., Alison Hall, Erika Hall & Jamie Perry, Black & Blue: Exploring Racial and
Ethnic Bias and Law Enforcement in the Killings of Unarmed Black Male Civilians, 71:3 AM. PSYCH.
175-186, 182 (2016) (suggesting that among the factors contributing to police killings of Black
men, “racial imbalances between communities and their police forces may be especially
problematic.”).
147. Numerous police departments have argued, and courts have accepted, that racial di-
versity among law enforcement is necessary for effective policing, particularly in minority com-
munities. See, e.g., Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding race-
conscious police hiring). See also Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002);
Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996); Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers
Ass’n, 10 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1993).
148. See, e.g., Dan Goldhaber, Roddy Theobald & Christopher Tien, White Paper: The
Theoretical & Empirical Arguments for Diversifying the Teacher Workforce: A Review of the Evidence at 2,
THE CENTER FOR EDUCATION DATA & RESEARCH WP 2015-9 (2015) (citing the extensive
scholarly literature promoting greater racial diversity among teachers).
149. School districts have similarly argued, with less success than police departments, that
racial diversity among teachers is necessary to effectively serve minority students. See Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 276 (1986) (rejecting race-conscious teacher lay-off plan
designed to achieve racial diversity among teachers); Piscataway School Bd. v. Taxman, 91 F.3d
1547 (3rd Cir. 1996).
150. Some legal scholars have grounded recent calls for judicial diversity in the doctrine of
diversity espoused in Grutter v. Bollinger rather than in the democratic equality principles of
Batson. See, e.g., Vargas, supra note 141, at 117 (relying on Grutter to support the call for a
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fully explored the underlying theories of democratic equality and procedu-
ral justice that inform the need for greater racial diversity in the judicial,
law enforcement or educational domains.  Filling this gap in the extant
literature, this section will offer greater doctrinal and theoretical grounding
for these claims by demonstrating how the call for greater racial diversity
among judges, police officers, and teachers is consistent with the demo-
cratic equality principles of Batson and how realizing this aim in each of
these domains will help legitimize these democratic institutions by increas-
ing perceptions of procedural fairness.151
B. Representative Bureaucracy as a Theory of Procedural Justice
The theory of procedural justice, with its focus on perceptions of the
justice system as a whole, can explain why increased racial diversity will
improve perceptions of legitimacy on behalf of judges, in addition to ju-
ries.152  It even has some application to police officers, who serve as front-
line decision-makers in our justice system.153  But it does not explain the
importance of racial diversity in the domain of public education generally,
or among teachers specifically. A related concept, representative bureau-
cracy, bridges the gap between the theory of procedural justice and the
domain of public education as a key site of civic participation, and between
judicial actors and teachers as key public decision-makers in our democ-
racy.154  Additionally, the theory of representative bureaucracy reinforces
the importance of racial diversity among judges and police officers as key
public decision-makers in the judicial and law enforcement domains.
“critical mass of minority judges on each bench.”). One notable exception is the work of Kevin
R. Johnson and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer. See Johnson % Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 19.  Johnson
and Fuentes-Rohwer rely on both Grutter and the “jury selection literature,” including in partic-
ular Batson, to inform their proscriptive claims for selecting judicial nominees with an eye toward
racial diversity. Id. at 10 (noting that “many of the arguments for diversity among jury pools
apply with equal force to the judiciary.”).
151. See also Torres-Spellisc, Chase & Gr4eenman, supra note 23 (taking for granted the
importance of judicial diversity and instead conducting empirical research of representative state
judicial nominating processes to determine best practices for increasing judicial diversity).
152. Diversity among judges is more important today than in the past as judges have ex-
panded their decision-making power to include many issues that were previously decided by the
jury. See Abramson, supra note 61, at 866, 898 (offering theoretical model for democracy legiti-
mizing features of jury that have equal application to judges). Id. at 870-71.
153. For a discussion of the application of the theory of procedural justice to police of-
ficers, see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing police studies in the procedural
justice literature).
154. J. Donald Kingsley first coined the term “representative bureaucracy” in 1944 in rela-
tion to British Parliamentary government, but it emerged in the American public administration
and then political science literature in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a recognition that bureau-
cratic agencies make more public policy decisions than do legislatures. M.E. SHARPE, REPRE-
SENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: CLASSIC READINGS & CONTINUING CONTROVERSIES (Julie Dolan
& David H. Rosenbloom eds., 2003).
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The premise of “representative bureaucracy” theory is that racial
congruence between bureaucrats and the citizens they serve influences
how minority citizens benefit from public decision-making by the bureau-
crat.155  In other words, representative bureaucracy posits that minority
citizens will experience greater civic benefit from bureaucrats who share
their racial background.156  The underlying reasons are much like the ac-
countability hypothesis in the jury context and involve an accrual of the
deliberative and representative benefits of diversity.157  Representative bu-
reaucracy theorizes that differences in social identity translate into different
social experiences.158  These experiences, in turn, contribute to differ-
ences in political attitudes, which are strongly correlated with political be-
haviors.159  Just as the accountability hypothesis in the jury context
predicts that racial diversity among jurors improves deliberations, particu-
larly in cases where minority interests are involved, representative bureau-
cracy theorizes that racial congruence between bureaucrats and citizens
improves policy outputs on behalf of minority citizens, particularly on is-
sues of high racial salience.160
155. Id. There are some differences among theorists in describing the benefits of represen-
tative democracy, which loosely correlate with Abramson’s epistemic, deliberative, and represen-
tative theories of jury diversity. See Abramson, supra note 61, at 866.  Donald Kingsley, who
coined the term in 1944, believes that government bureaucracies must reflect the larger populace
to ensure they reflect the wisdom and insight of the diverse views of the public. Id. at 4. Max
Weber, on the other hand, doubts that individual representatives can overcome institutional bu-
reaucratic cultures. Id. Frederick Mosher straddles these two views by acknowledging the impor-
tance of representative bureaucracy for enhancing public decision-making, but expresses
suspicion that identity congruence between bureaucrats and citizens will necessarily translate into
beneficial public policy for citizens because of their shared identity. Id. at 5.  Samuel Krislov
responds to Mosher’s concern by suggesting that the descriptive (or passive) representation that
arises from identity congruence between bureaucrats and citizens is itself beneficial because it
legitimizes government by promoting the ideal of equality. Id. at 6.  Despite these conflicting
theoretical perspectives, each of these theorists acknowledges the importance of representative
bureaucracy, regardless of their disagreement over its precise consequences for citizens.  Moreo-
ver, the empirical data demonstrates that representative bureaucracy can inure to the benefit of
minority citizens. See infra note 159.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 52 (describing benefits as “enhancing administrative responsiveness . . . re-
dressing [ ] underrepresentation . . . [and] legitimizing government.”).
158. Id. at 85; see also Hong-Hai Lim, Representative Bureaucracy: Rethinking Substantive Ef-
fects & Active Representation, PUB. ADMIN. REV. (Mar./Apr. 2006).
159. SHARPE, supra note 154, at 85. This theory and each of these linkages have been
confirmed by at least some empirical research relating to race, whereas some other demographic
characteristics, such as gender, wealth or education are only weakly correlated with bureaucratic
decision-making. Id. at 89-90. Given the distinct social construction of racial identity, it is unsur-
prising that racial identity has strong correlations with social experiences and, consequently,
political attitudes. See generally LOPEZ, supra note 3, discussing the social construction of racial
identity.
160. This is particularly true where bureaucrats exercise substantial discretion. Sharpe, supra
note 154, 122 and 126. See also Nick A. Theobald & Donald P. Haider-Markel, Race, Bureaucracy
& Symbolic Representation: Interactions Between and Police, 19 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THE-
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Several examples in the relevant domains of policing and teaching
illustrate the point.  Studies have found that Black and Latino police of-
ficers treat Black and Latino motorists less punitively than White police
officers by, for instance, issuing fewer citations.161  Similarly, a study
showed that Black teachers treat Black students more favorably by assigning
them to gifted classes three times more often than do White teachers.162
Another study of teachers found less punitive treatment of Black students,
as measured by formal discipline, based on student/teacher racial congru-
ence.163 If we consider police officers and teachers as bureaucrats and their
actions as policy outputs, these findings suggest that positive benefits do
accrue to minority citizens from having bureaucrats who share their racial
identity.
Representative bureaucracy theory is even reinforced in the judicial
domain.  Judicial behavioralism is the branch of political science that ap-
plies empirical methods to determine the relationship, if any, between the
personal attributes of judges and their rulings.164  This is like studying the
policy outputs of judges as bureaucrats.  Judicial behavioralism offers find-
ings and conclusions regarding the racially congruent effects of judicial
decision-making that are consistent with the findings of representative bu-
reaucracy for police officers and teachers, namely that racial congruence
between judges and litigants matters for how judges decide individual
cases.165
In one study, researchers found that plaintiffs in racial harassment
cases had higher success rates when their cases were decided by  African
ORY 409-426 (2008) (“[R]esearch suggests that the presence of African American and Hispanic
elected officials increases the likelihood that African American and Hispanic interests are repre-
sented in policy processes,” and suggesting the same phenomenon operates with even greater
force among unelected public officials).
161. Id.  Additionally, research suggests that, consistent with procedural justice theory, mi-
nority citizens perceive police as more legitimate when there is racial congruence between citi-
zens and police. Id.; see also Jason A. Grissom & Christopher Redding, Discretion and
Disproportionality: Explaining the Underrepresentation of High-Achieving Students of Color in Gifted
Programs, Vol. 2, No. 1 AERA OPEN, 1-25 at 2 (Jan. – Mar. 2016).
162. See Grissom & Redding, supra note 161, at 1-4. This race congruent effect in the
educational context has not similarly been found to exist for White, Hispanic or Asian students.
Id. at 10.  This may be due, in part, to the higher salience of Black identity than Hispanic or
Asian identity. See generally LOPEZ, supra note 3.
163. See also SHARPE, supra note 154, at 128-129 (finding in a study of Florida Public
Schools that teacher/student racial congruence is associated with fewer assignments to remedial
classes, more assignments to gifted classes and less disciplinary action for Black students).
164. See Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-blind Judge: An Empirical
Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1117 (2009); see also Sylvia R. Lazos
Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics in Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83
Ind. L. J. 1423, 1471 (2008).
165. These studies have found that racial congruence between judges and litigants matters
in cases of high racial salience. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 164, at 1134 (describing the
significance of judges’ race in cases alleging racial discrimination).
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American judges (45.8%), than when their cases were decided by either
White judges (20.6%) or Hispanic judges (19%).166  Notably, critics often
claim that it is not this descriptive representation (or racial congruence)
that matters among key public decision-makers, but that instead, it is sub-
stantive representation (or interest congruence) that matters most.167
These critics argue that it matters less whether public decision-makers look
like you than whether they share your political commitments.168  But this
study of judicial decisions in racial harassment cases found that the statisti-
cal disparity in outcomes by race held even after controlling for judges’
political affiliation.169  African American judges who were both Democrat
(47%) and Republican (43%) ruled in favor of Black plaintiffs significantly
more often than either White Democrats (27.1%) or White Republicans
(16.6%).170
Another study similarly found that African American judges were
more than twice as likely to rule in favor of Voting Rights Act plaintiffs
than their White counterparts.171  Moreover, consistent with the account-
166. Id.  The study was based on a random sampling of racial harassment cases across six
federal circuits for the period 1981 – 2003. Id. at 1138.  The success rate before a Black judge
(45.8 percent) was twice the overall rate of success rate of (22 percent). Id. at 1141.
167. See, e.g., Royce Brooks, Electing One of Our Own: The Importance of Black Representa-
tion for Black Communities in the Context of Local Government, 3 AM. U. MODERN AM. 33, 37-38
(2007) (responding to this critique by expressing a preference for descriptive representation over
substantive representation in local elections where the need for effective interest representation is
most acute).
168. Id.
169. Chew & Kelley, supra note 164, at 1149.
170. Id. This means that although Black Republicans were slightly less likely to rule in
favor of race discrimination plaintiffs than were Black Democrats and White Republicans were
also significantly less likely to do so than White Democrats, Black Republicans and Black Demo-
crats were 2-3 times more likely to rule in favor of race discrimination plaintiffs than were their
White counterparts. Id. Providing further confirmation of the importance of identity congru-
ence between judges and litigants, another study found that judges’ gender was not significantly
correlated with judicial decisions in racial discrimination cases, but judges’ gender was correlated
with outcomes in sex discrimination cases. See Pat K. Chew, Judges, Gender & Employment Dis-
crimination Cases: Emerging Evidence Based Empirical Conclusions, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
359, 366 (2011).  Interestingly, the judges’ race was correlated with different rulings in both race
and sex discrimination cases, with African American judges ruling in favor of sex discrimination
plaintiffs twice as often as their White counterparts and ruling in favor of race discrimination
plaintiffs more than twice as often as their White counterparts. Id. at 370.
171. Voting Rights Act plaintiffs are more often than not African American. See Adam
Cox & Thomas Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008).  Additional
studies confirm the significance of racial congruence between judges and litigants by evaluating
racial disparities in criminal sentencing. See David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (2012).  Al-
though generally judges impose harsher sentences on Black criminal defendants than on White
criminal defendants, one study found a statistically significant reduction in the magnitude of the
racial disparity among African American judges, suggesting that minority defendants are treated
less harshly by African American judges than by judges of other races. Id.
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ability hypothesis on the deliberative diversity benefits of racially heteroge-
neous decision-makers from the jury context, this study also found that on
appeal, White judges were significantly more likely to find a violation of
the Voting Rights Act when they sat on a panel with an African-American
judge than when they sat on an all-White judicial panel.172  These empiri-
cal findings confirm the importance of racial diversity among judges for
the same reasons that representative bureaucracy theory promotes racial
diversity among police officers and teachers—it increases democratic ac-
countability on behalf of minority citizens, which in turn promotes demo-
cratic legitimacy.173
Despite clear evidence of the benefits that accrue for minority citi-
zens from increased racial diversity among judges, police officers and
teachers, Nancy Sherer suggests that opposition to these efforts will persist
unless proponents are able to convince Whites that they too benefit from
this increased diversity.174  This acknowledgment that minorities will not
achieve equality in the absence of the convergence of their interests with
the interest of Whites is not new.175  Responding to this concern for “in-
terest convergence,” following is an analysis of the broader implications of
this failure to achieve greater racial diversity among judges, police officers,
and teachers.
C. The Consequences of Failing to Achieve Democratic Equality
The reasons we should strive to improve the racial diversity of our
judges, police officers, and teachers are  not limited to the idea that princi-
ples of democratic equality demand it as a theoretical or doctrinal matter,
172. Cox & Miles, supra note 171, at 45.
173. Not surprisingly, given these findings and the widespread calls for greater racial diver-
sity among judges, attempts to diversify the federal bench extend as far back as the Carter Ad-
ministration in the 1970s. See Sherer, supra note 21, at 601 (marking the start of efforts to
diversity the federal judiciary with President Carter, observing, “[w]hen President Jimmy
Carter took office in 1977, there were but eight women (1.4% of all federal court judges at that
time), twenty African-Americans (3.5%), and five Hispanics (0.9%) on the federal bench (includ-
ing both active and senior status judges). Believing that such imbalance jeopardized the integrity
of the entire justice system, President Carter became the first president to implement a far-
reaching appointment strategy with diversity as its cornerstone,” and citing President Clinton as
the “first to make descriptive representation the cornerstone of his judicial selection strategy . . .
promising to make . . . appointed positions ‘look like America.’”
174. Sherer, supra note 21, at 631.
175. Derrick Bell first espoused the interest convergence theory in a 1980 Harvard Law
Review article addressing the successes and failures of Brown v. Board of Education.  Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518
(1980). Bell suggested generally that the guarantee of equality for Blacks and other minority
groups will remain unrealized unless and until these claims can be aligned with the interests of
Whites, and he specifically observed that the momentary success of efforts to racially integrate
public schools, epitomized by Brown, was achieved only because of the concurrent international
pressures to disavow racism and promote democratic equality in the aftermath of World War II.
Id. at 524.
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or because it will benefit minority citizens specifically.  Allen observes that
democracy is marked by the inevitability of loss, but she cautions that
when any group suffers continual losses the stability of democracy is
threatened.176 Examples from each of these domains demonstrate the dev-
astating practical consequences for our democracy and the real losses that
accrue for all citizens when public decision-makers fail to reflect the diver-
sity of the communities they serve and, consequently, are incapable of en-
suring accountability, engendering trust, or promoting legitimacy on
behalf of these democratic institutions.
The examples below are merely illustrative of the types of harms,
both to our democracy and to our citizenry, that arise from our failure to
ensure that judges, police officers and teachers reflect the racial diversity of
the communities they serve.  Using the “school to prison pipeline” phe-
nomenon to frame this problem,177 the following demonstrates how public
decision-makers, i.e., teachers, police officers and judges, at each successive
point in this pipeline lack accountability to minority citizens and contrib-
ute to negative outcomes that have the potential to erode trust in these
institutions, undermine their legitimacy and ultimately, as Allen suggests,
may threaten the long-term stability of our democracy.
1. When Teachers Lack Accountability Minority Students Suffer
We have long recognized that public education provides the founda-
tion for good citizenship and the best opportunity for children to flourish
as engaged citizens and as productive individuals.178  Despite this recogni-
tion, public schools have failed to educate all  citizens equally.  There has
been a stubborn racial achievement gap in American education dating
back decades.179 Black and Hispanic students are underrepresented among
176. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 108-111. See also Eskridge, supra note 31 (similarly ex-
plaining the “stakes-raising” threat posed to democracy when minority groups suffer continual
political losses).
177. For a general discussion of the racialized nature of this problem, see Nance, supra note
127.
178. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments . . . It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. . . [I]t is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in prepar-
ing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment. . . [I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”). See also FREDERICK
C. MOSHER, DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE, 27-28 (2nd Ed. 1982) (describing public
education as the most significant institution by which any society can transmit its “ethos, frames
of reference and knowledge,” and perhaps more importantly by which access is granted to “dif-
ferent strata and specializations of position within . . . the public service”).
179. See Goldhaber, Theobald & Tien, supra note 148, at 2.
32 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 23:1
high academic achievers.180  At the same time, they are overrepresented in
remedial education classes and among school disciplinary cases.181  The
reasons for this achievement gap are complex and some are unknown, but
recent research reveals that academic achievement for Black students in
particular is positively correlated with teacher/student racial congru-
ence.182  This research suggests that we could narrow the existing racial
achievement gap , increase the number of Black students in gifted classes,
reduce the number in remedial education classes, and lower the rate of
discipline for Black students simply by increasing the number of Black
teachers and improving the rate of student/teacher racial congruence.183
Existing racial disparities between public school students and their
teachers suggest there is significant room for improvement.184  Half (50%)
of all public school students are racial minorities, the vast majority of
whom are Black and Hispanic, but less than one-fifth (18%) of public
school teachers are racial minorities.185  These racial disparities are ex-
pected to get worse as the population of public school students gets more
diverse over time.186  Although there are various reasons why public
school teachers are less racially diverse than their students, one of the rea-
sons is that minority teachers are hired at lower rates than their White
peers.187  This is a troubling trend that public schools ought to try more
deliberately to redress if we are to ensure that all children have an equal
opportunity to become productive citizens.188
180. See Status & Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Groups 2016 at iv and 38,
NCES, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016007.pdf. (summarizing achievement gap and dispari-
ties in discipline, as well as disparities in special education).
181. Id.
182. See Goldhaber, Theobald & Tien, supra note 148, at 3. See also Hannah Putnam et al.,
High Hopes and Harsh Realities: The Real Challenges to Building a Diverse Workforce, BROWN
CENTER ON EDUCATION POLICY (Aug. 2016).
183. See SHARPE, supra note 154, at 128.
184. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
185. See Putnam et al. supra note 182, at 4.
186. The share of minority students will grow from fifty percent to two-thirds by the year
2060. Id.  This growth in the diversity of students is expected to far exceed the growth in the
diversity of teachers, which is only expected to increase from eighteen percent to approximately
thirty percent. Id. at 5.
187. Id. at 7.  Some of the other reasons include lower levels of college degree attainment
among Blacks and Hispanics in particular and lower levels of interest in teaching as a career
among minorities generally. Id. at 6.
188. See Putnam et al., supra note 182. This is not to suggest that closing the racial gap
between teachers and students would be easy.  Data suggest that simply hiring minority teachers
at the same rate White teachers are hired would not significantly close the racial gap between
students and teachers. Id. at 11.  However, there is no reason to believe that minority teachers
could not be hired at higher rates than White teachers given the existing (and growing) dispari-
ties between minority students and teachers. Id. (this diversity hiring strategy would have to
increase minority hiring substantially above the rate at which White teachers are currently hired
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2. When Communities Mistrust Police Lives Are Lost
Even more troubling perhaps than this lack of academic accountabil-
ity to minority students are the fatal consequences that have resulted from
the erosion of trust between law enforcement and minority communities.
Recent news reports have chronicled the strained relations and growing
mistrust between law enforcement and minority communities across the
country.189  The issue has garnered so much national attention that both
the Democratic and Republican candidates addressed it as a primary pillar
of their campaigns during the 2016 presidential election.190  Although
there is much disagreement from all sides of the debate on the solutions to
this problem, there is one point of consensus—trust between minority
communities and the police is dangerously low, and the consequence has
been deadly.191
According to recent data, Black citizens are more than twice as likely
to be shot by police than either White or Hispanic citizens, and are six
times more likely to be shot by police than Asian citizens.192  Blacks re-
present less than thirteen percent of the U.S. population, but roughly one
quarter of unarmed persons killed by police.193  Even when the conse-
quence of policing in minority communities is not deadly, it is often dev-
astating.  The Department of Justice, for instance, has concluded that some
local law enforcement agencies have engaged in patterns of discriminatory
policing in minority communities that have resulted in unlawful arrests and
because a nominal increase would not significantly impact the existing or projected racial dispar-
ity). Despite the admitted difficulty of the task, it should not foreclose the effort.
189. See, e.g., Timothy Williams, Official Apologizes for Police Role in Mistrust by Minorities,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2016 (acknowledging the increasingly strained relations between police
and Black communities).
190. Democratic presidential nominee Hilary Clinton was sympathetic to calls for police to
rebuild trust with minority communities. See Candace Smith, How the Presidential Candidates
Differ on Police Brutality, ABC NEWS (July 8, 2016), abcnews.go.com/politics/presidential-candi-
dates-differ-police-brutality/story?id=40440463. Presidential nominee Donald Trump seemed
to dismiss these concerns with calls for more emphasis on “law and order.” Id.
191. The president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Terrence M. Cun-
ningham, has acknowledged this “deepening mistrust of law enforcement within predominantly
Black and Hispanic communities.” See Williams, supra note 189. See also Michele L. Jawando &
Billy Corriher, More Money, More Problems, CTR FOR AM. PROGRESS 5 (2015) (highlighting the
growing distrust between minority communities and law enforcement specifically, and the jus-
tice system more generally).
192. See The Counted, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2015/jun/
01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database.  Native Americans are the only racial group more
likely to be shot by police than Blacks. Id.
193. 242 of the 1001 people killed by police between January 1, 2016 and December 9,
2016 were Black, and 38 of the 139 unarmed people killed by police during the same period
were Black. Id.  According to the 2010 Census, Blacks comprise 12.8 percent of the U.S. popu-
lation. See www.census.gov.
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the use of non-lethal, excessive force.194  Responding to these concerns,
the Department of Justice has acknowledged that rebuilding trust must be
at the heart of any efforts to repair relations between minority communi-
ties and law enforcement.195
And it is not just Black deaths at the hands of police officers that have
deepened the mistrust between law enforcement and minority communi-
ties.  It is also the police response to Black deaths at the hands of other
citizens.  From the killing of unarmed teenager Trayvon Martin in 2012 by
White neighborhood watchman George Zimmerman, to the more recent
killing of professional football player Joe McKnight by a White motorist
during a “road rage” incident, minority communities have expressed
mounting frustration with police officers for the perceived reluctance of
law enforcement to arrest and/or seek prosecution of White perpetrators
when the victim is Black.196  This frustration is in stark contrast with what
is often perceived as over-policing by law enforcement in minority com-
munities when they are instead the perpetrators of crime, sometimes with
fatal consequences.197
The deaths of unarmed Blacks in particular at the hands of police
have spurred protest movements across the country by citizens beleaguered
with the state of police/minority relations.198  And the death toll is adding
up on both sides. During a recent protest of police shootings in Dallas,
Texas, five police officers were fatally shot.199  This growing mistrust be-
tween law enforcement and minority communities is not simply a matter
of democratic legitimacy; it is a matter of life and death.
194. Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL
RIGHTS DIVISION (Aug. 10, 2016).
195. See Greene, supra note 48, at 1269 (describing Attorney General Eric Holder’s 2014
National Initiative for Building Community Trust & Justice).
196. According to news reports, Joe McKnight was unarmed when he approached the
vehicle of Ronald Gasser, the White man who fatally shot McKnight over a traffic incident. See
Daniel Victor, Joe McKnight Shooting: Man Is Charged Days Later in Fatal ‘Road Rage,’  N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2016.  Local Black citizens criticized the Jefferson Parish Sheriff for being “slow-
footed” in handling the McKnight investigation “because of the race of the two men.” Id.  Local
NAACP leaders and others were particularly critical of the sheriff’s decision to release Mr. Gasser
rather than charge him for the murder initially, saying “they believed he would not have been
freed if he were Black and that justice would be less swift because Mr. McKnight was Black.” Id.
197. See The Counted, supra note 192.
198. The most widely known movement is the Black Lives Matter Movement formed after
the 2012 death of Trayvon Martin. The number of Black police shooting victims is being chron-
icled by The Counted, but some of the more high-profile cases that have garnered national
media attention since the 2012 death of Trayvon Martin include: Michael Brown (2014, MI),
Eric Garner (2014, NY), Tamir Rice (2014, OH), Akai Gurley (2014, NY), Laquan McDonald
(2015, IL), Freddie Gray (2015, MD), Walter Scott (2015, SC), Alton Sterling (2016, LA), Rekia
Boyd (2016, IL), Terrence Crutcher (2016, OK), Philando Castille (2017, MN), and Jordan
Edwards (2017, TX).
199. See Manny Fernandez, Richard Perez-Pena & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Five Dallas
Officers Were Killed As Payback, Police Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2016.
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Given the low numbers of minority police officers currently, at least
some calls for police reform emphasize the importance of improving the
racial diversity of law enforcement in communities of color.200  According
to one recent report surveying 269 local jurisdictions, racial minorities are
underrepresented among law enforcement by an average of twenty-four
percentage points relative to census population estimates of the racial com-
position of the communities served.201  In thirty-five of the eighty-five
jurisdictions in which racial minorities are in the majority, the racial dis-
parity between citizens and the police was more than fifty percent.202  If
the theories of procedural justice and representative bureaucracy are cor-
rect, increasing the racial diversity of police officers in these communities
will not only improve trust between law enforcement and these communi-
ties, it will also increase accountability to minority citizens.203  Rebuilding
trust and fostering greater accountability to minority communities may be
the best safeguard against the continued threats to the democratic legiti-
macy of law enforcement posed by ongoing police shootings and the re-
sulting minority protests.
3. When Judges Lack Legitimacy the Judicial System is Undermined
Finally, at the last stage of this pipeline, we must ensure the legiti-
macy of the rule of law by ensuring that judicial decision-making is proce-
durally fair, starting with increasing the racial diversity of judges.204  First,
increased racial diversity among judges may help ameliorate some of the
lingering concerns with the administration of Batson challenges in the jury
context based on empirical evidence of minority judges’ greater willing-
ness to credit claims of racial discrimination.205  Second, and perhaps more
important, when the bench lacks sufficient diversity, judges themselves can
decide cases in ways that compromise the appearance of procedural fairness
and undermine the legitimacy of the justice system.
200. See supra note 146-147;. See also David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Depart-
ment: Making Sense of the new Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY
1209 (2006) (observing the benefits of increased diversity among law enforcement due to affirm-
ative action efforts of the 1970s and ’80s and calling for continued efforts to improve the diversity
of law enforcement).
201. Diversity on the Force: Where Police Don’t Mirror the Community, GOVERNING (Sept.
2015).
202. Id.
203. See Sklansky, supra note 200, at 1230 (citing evidence that Black police officers re-
spond differently to claims of racial profiling and excessive force).
204. See Barbara Graham, Toward An Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American Courts,
10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 183 (2004) (detailing diversity of federal bench); Tracey E. George &
Albert H. Yoon, The Gavel Gap: Who Sits in Judgement on State Courts?, AM. CONST. SOCIETY
FOR L. & POL’Y (2016) (citing statistics on the lack of gender and racial/ethnic diversity among
state court judges).
205. See Chew & Mears, supra note 164 (describing a study of judges’ decision-making
patterns in cases alleging racial discrimination).
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Aaron Persky is a White judge of the Superior Court in Santa Clara
County, CA.  A recent case over which Judge Persky presided demon-
strates the threat to judicial legitimacy posed by judges whose decision-
making is perceived as procedurally unfair.  Judge Persky garnered national
attention in June 2016, when he presided over a case in which Brock Tur-
ner, a White Stanford alum and an accomplished student athlete, had been
convicted of three counts of felony sexual assault of a fellow Stanford stu-
dent.206  Under California law, Turner’s conviction carried a minimum
penalty of two years on each count of sexual assault.207  Despite the prose-
cutor’s recommendation for a longer sentence, Judge Persky sentenced
Turner to a mere six months in the county jail.208
Judge Persky elicited immediate objections from those who ques-
tioned the Judge’s lenient sentencing of Turner in view of his crimes.209
But things grew worse still for Judge Persky when it soon came to light
that there was another rape case over which Judge Persky presided where
the defendant, Raul Ramirez, a thirty-two year old immigrant from El
Salvador, was also charged with sexually assaulting his female roommate in
a case that news reports described as having striking similarities to the case
involving Brock Turner.210  Suspicions regarding the propriety of Judge
Persky’s sentencing in the Turner case only grew after news reports high-
lighted substantial differences in Judge Persky’s treatment of Ramirez, de-
spite factual similarities in the two cases.211  Perhaps most notable was
Persky’s alleged agreement with the prosecutor that Ramirez should re-
ceive a state prison sentence of three years even though Ramirez had no
criminal history.  In stark contrast, Persky had observed on the record in
the Turner case that “[a] prison sentence would have a severe impact on
him” and, therefore, his lack of criminal history justified a light
sentence.212
Speculation arose that Judge Persky’s sentencing of Turner and Ra-
mirez was based more on race than on the merits of the cases.213 Not
206. Judge Persky himself is a Stanford graduate and former athlete. Sam Levin, Stanford
Trial Judge Oversees Much Harsher Sentence in Similar Assault Case, THE GUARDIAN, Jun. 27, 2016.
207. Id.
208. Turner also received three years’ probation. Id.
209. See Mary Elizabeth Williams, Brock Turner Judge’s Credibility Gone: Prosecutors Have
Persky Removed from a Similar Sexual Assault Case, SALON, Jun. 15, 2016. Persky was subjected to
both a recall campaign and legislative calls for judicial investigation. Id.  The removal petition
garnered 1.4 million supporters. Id.
210. Levin, supra note 206.
211. As reported by the media, Ramirez’s bail was set at $200,000, while Turner’s had
been set at $150,000. Id. Ramirez was sentenced to three years in prison under a plea deal
overseen by Persky, while Persky gave Turner only six months jail time following his jury con-
viction. Id.
212. Id.
213. When these differences were made public, Michele Landis Dauber, the Stanford pro-
fessor leading the recall campaign, said, “this just shows that our concern about Judge Persky’s
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surprisingly, the citizens of Santa Clara County perceived Judge Persky’s
sentencing in the Brock Turner case as procedurally unfair.214  As a result
public trust in the judicial system was undermined.215  There was a public
campaign to have Judge Persky recalled, and citizens refused to serve on
juries in Judge Persky’s courtroom.216  At least one prosecutor filed a mo-
tion to recuse Judge Persky from another sexual assault case, expressing a
lack of confidence in his ability to render an impartial judgment in that
case.217
Santa Clara County is not the only place where citizens lack confi-
dence in courts where largely White judges preside over what appears to
be a system of racialized justice.218  When judges lack legitimacy, the judi-
cial system is incapable of performing its primary function of meting out
justice in a manner that wins the people’s consent.219  This failure has the
potential to erode the trust in the judiciary that is critical to the effective
functioning of our justice system.220
III. LESSONS FROM BATSON: DIVERSIFYING THE JUDICIARY, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS
According to the theories of procedural justice and representative bu-
reaucracy, achieving racial diversity among judges, police officers, and
teachers is necessary to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary,
ability to be unbiased is justified. We continue to think that he abused his discretion in giving an
unduly lenient sentence to Turner.” Id.
214. See Williams, supra note 209. A judicial review board concluded that Judge Perky’s
sentencing of Brock Turner was not inappropriate as a matter of law, but Judge Persky is still the
target of a recall campaign. Judge Persky Cleared in Misconduct for Sentence in Brock Turner Sex
Assault Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 19, 2016) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/
judge-cleared-misconduct-sentence-brock-turner-sex-assault-case-n697941.  This is consistent
with procedural justice theory, which says that it is the perceived fairness of the process, not the
substantive outcome, that influences perceptions of judicial legitimacy. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
215. Levin, supra note 206.
216. More than a dozen jurors have since refused to serve in Persky’s courtroom, citing his
decision in the Turner case. See Thomas Fuller, Opposition to Judge in Stanford Sexual Assault Case
Grows, In & Out of Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2016.
217. Id.
218. The criminal justice system of Cook County, Illinois, which includes Chicago, was
the subject of an ethnography that described it as a system “where mostly white professionals are
charged with vetting, sorting, and judging the morality of a racialized population” in a way that
“reproduce[s] racism and racial stigma at numerous contact points.” NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN
CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY 185 (2016).
219. See ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 104,125 (discussing the importance of jury diversity
to the legitimacy of the judicial system). See also Jawando & Corriher, supra note 191, at 5
(“[W]hen judges do not look like the defendant litigants in court, . . . communities of color will
have a more difficult time . . . trusting their decisions.”).
220. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at xix (asserting that the failure to “incorporate reasonable
interests” of political minorities destabilizes democratic institutions).
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law enforcement, and public schools as institutions of government.221
Achieving greater racial diversity among the key public decision-makers in
each of these domains will also avoid the kinds of losses currently exper-
ienced by minority citizens as described above that may inflame racial ten-
sions and that Danielle Allen suggests may threaten the long-term stability
of our democracy.222  To forestall this possibility, we ought to consciously
pursue racial diversity in each of these domains in the same way and for the
same reasons we engage in race-conscious jury selection.223  The race-
conscious efforts undertaken by jury commissioners and judges to ensure
diversity in jury selection as a means of promoting trust and accountability
to minority citizens and ensuring the democratic legitimacy of the judicial
system offer vital insights and critical lessons for how we ought to similarly
pursue racial diversity in each of these other important democratic
domains.
Equal protection doctrine requires that all government uses of race
satisfy the highest standard of judicial review, known as strict scrutiny.224
Strict scrutiny demands that any use of race be: (1) justified by a compel-
ling government interest, and (2) narrowly tailored to meet the asserted
interest.225  Relying on the principles of democratic equality embodied in
Batson, as well as the social science research on procedural justice and rep-
resentative bureaucracy, this strict scrutiny standard can be satisfied to sup-
port similar race-conscious efforts to achieve greater racial diversity among
judges, police officers, and teachers.226
A. Racial Diversity as a Compelling Interest
Theories of procedural justice and representative bureaucracy
demonstrate that racial diversity promotes the trust and accountability nec-
essary to legitimize democratic institutions generally and specifically to le-
221. See supra Sections I.B. and II.B.
222. See supra Section II.C.  Some of the Black Lives Matter protests have already been
described as “riots,” and each new acquittal of a White police officer in a case involving the
death of a Black shooting victims runs the risk of inciting the kinds of riots that ensued in the
wake of the acquittal in the Rodney King beating trial. See Johnson & Fuentes-Rowher, supra
note 19, at 44 (referring to the riots following the King verdict and observing “[i]n certain
instances, the questionable legitimacy of the decision-maker contributes to the potential for civil
unrest.”).
223. See Alschuler, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
224. See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (adopting strict scrutiny standard for
race/national origin classifications); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989) (holding benign uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny to the same extent as invidious
uses of race).
225. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 506.
226. Although she uses Grutter v. Bollinger instead of Batson v. Kentucky to ground her
claim, and she addresses jury diversity rather than the diversity of the judiciary, Phoebe Haddon
has similarly argued that democratic equality principles can justify race-conscious jury selection
under the strict scrutiny standard. See Haddon, supra note 114.
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gitimize the individual decision-making of judges, police officers, and
teachers as public bureaucrats vis-à-vis minority citizens.227  Achieving the
democratic legitimacy that accrues from this racial diversity is undoubtedly
a compelling government interest.228  The previously highlighted research
demonstrates that minorities have lower levels of trust in the judicial sys-
tem overall and that White judges are less accountable to minority liti-
gants.229  Law enforcement and public schools also suffer from a crisis of
legitimacy among minority citizens who view these institutions as both
untrustworthy and/or insufficiently accountable to  their interests, particu-
larly the interests of Black and Hispanic citizens.230 Thus the need to en-
sure democratic legitimacy in these domains by fostering trust and
promoting accountability on behalf of minority citizens is as pressing as it
is in the judicial domain.231
Nevertheless, the claim that racial diversity can be a constitutionally
compelling interest often generates a variety of objections.  First, the diver-
sity interest is often criticized in the scholarly literature for its presumptive
failure to align with the social justice goals underlying equal protection
doctrine.232  According to this critique, the focus on pragmatic ends, such
as educational or commercial benefits, makes the diversity interest incom-
patible with equal protection doctrine.233  Anderson herself expresses this
concern, noting that despite the ways in which the diversity interest might
be otherwise superior to the more traditional remedial interest associated
227. See supra Section II.B.
228. The Supreme Court said as much in Grutter v. Bollinger when it recognized student
body diversity as a sufficiently compelling interest based on the benefits that accrue in the form
of, among other things, enhanced democratic legitimacy through “effective participation by
members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation.” 539 U.S. 306, 325, 332
(2003).
229. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing research on minorities’ views
that the judiciary is racially biased) and notes 166-170 and accompanying text (observing that
Black judges find in favor of Black litigants more often than White or Hispanic judges).
230. The lack of trust between minority communities and the police is well-documented.
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Book Review: Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: Innova-
tion and Response, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1194, 1200 (2008) (discussing various studies of
minority/police relations and finding “a continuing racial divide in which White respondents
exhibit a much more favorable attitude toward the police than do Blacks or Latinos,” noting in
particular that “[m]inorities perceive that police represent and defend White group interests,
while Whites see the police as fair or, worst, guilty of “rational discrimination.’”).  Similarly, the
lack of accountability to minority student interests in public education is evident in the intracta-
ble racial achievement gap.
231. During the Clinton Administration, the Justice Department argued that pursuing ra-
cial diversity in public employment could satisfy the constitutional strict scrutiny standard be-
cause such diversity improves public decision-making and “promote[s] community trust and
confidence” in government.” SHARPE, supra note 154 at 31.  These reasons echo the justifica-
tions for pursuing racial diversity in the jury context. See BICKEL, supra note 26.
232. See ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 141.
233. Id.
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with equal protection doctrine,234 it suffers from the flaw of being “di-
vorced from the aims of social justice.”235  This critique, however, ignores
the fact that social justice is itself one of the instrumental aims pursued by
the diversity interest.236
In the words of Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority in Grutter
v. Bollinger,237 where the Court first recognized the diversity interest as
constitutionally compelling, one of the instrumental ends sought by the
diversity interest is to ensure “[e]ffective participation by members of all
racial and ethnic  groups in the civic life of our Nation” and thereby to
realize “the dream of one Nation, indivisible.”238  Thus, social justice is
not divorced from the instrumental goal of diversity; it is one of several
instrumental goals of the diversity interest.239  This instrumental diversity
interest has already been recognized as constitutionally compelling and,
therefore, capable of justifying affirmative, race-conscious efforts to ensure
meaningful participation by racial minorities in the various civic institu-
tions that comprise our democracy.240
The second objection that often surfaces both in the literature and in
the jurisprudence on affirmative, race-conscious efforts in pursuit of diver-
sity is that if the interest is in “epistemic diversity,” then race-conscious
selection is not necessary to achieve this goal.241  Rather, we ought to
utilize race-neutral methods to select directly for this epistemic diversity
234. Among some of the ways Anderson argues the diversity interest is superior to the
compensatory/remedial interest are that it (1) expands the contexts in which affirmative, race-
conscious efforts are permissible, (2) explains why even persons not otherwise disadvantaged
might nevertheless benefit under a diversity model, and (3) offers a non-stigmatizing account of
the reasons for employing race-conscious efforts that might otherwise foment resentment and
division. Id.
235. Id. at 142.
236. Anderson acknowledges this in identifying one of several aims of the diversity interest
as “advanc[ing] democracy.” Id. at 136.  Notably, this pragmatic diversity end seems indistin-
guishable from Anderson’s description of one of the ends of the preferred integrative model of
diversity as “advanc[ing] a democratic culture, by providing opportunities for citizens from all
walks of life . . . to advance democratic government by creating an integrated and thereby more
competent and accountable elite, better disposed and able to honor the rights and serve the
interests of all members of society, regardless of their group identities.” Id.  at 148.
237. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Grutter notably, is the case that Anderson identifies with the
integrative model, reinforcing its alignment with the diversity interest. See ANDERSON, supra
note 21, at 136.
238. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
239. For a fuller discussion of this social justice diversity interest espoused in Grutter, see
Stacy Hawkins, Diversity, Democracy & Pluralism: Confronting the Reality of Our Inequality, 66 MER-
CER L. REV. 577, 609-613 (2015).
240. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332.
241. For an articulation of this objection, see, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 579 U.S. ___,
136 S. Ct. 2198, 2232 (2016) (Alito, J. dissenting). See also Dawinder S. Sidhu, Racial Mirroring,
17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1335, 1388-1389 (2015).
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without relying on race as a proxy for it.242  This objection is misplaced for
several reasons. First, this argument misapprehends the dual interests served
by ensuring effective minority participation in our democracy.  Recall that
Allen and Anderson identify both trust and accountability as the critical
values fostered by effective minority participation in our democracy.243 As
the theory of procedural justice demonstrates, racial diversity engenders
trust when minority citizens see themselves represented in the institutions
of government, regardless of whether or how the presence of those minor-
ity representatives influence substantive outcomes in the democratic deci-
sion-making process.244  Thus race-conscious selection is necessary for
achieving the descriptive representation that fosters trust in public deci-
sion-makers.245
Accountability, on the other hand, does depend on the assumption
of some epistemic diversity that allows minority representatives to increase
responsiveness to minority interests in democratic deliberations.246  How-
ever, there is an erroneous assumption underlying this critique of race-
conscious efforts in pursuit of epistemic diversity.247  Anderson explains
that the diversity interest does not rely on race as a proxy for presumed
cultural difference, as this objection assumes, but as a proxy for “personal
knowledge.”248  Guaranteeing meaningful civic participation by racial  mi-
norities ensures that democracy realizes the epistemic benefits of its diverse
citizens who are “asymmetrically affected by various social problems and
policy responses to those problems.”249  In other words, minority citizens
necessarily have different “personal knowledge” about social problems
than non-minority citizens.250  Consequently, race is not only necessary to
242. Id.
243. See ANDERSON, supra note 21.
244. This is known as “descriptive representation” and is treated extensively in the litera-
ture on minority voting and electoral representation. See Hawkins, Diversity, Democracy & Plural-
ism, supra note 238, at 643.  Elizabeth Anderson addresses the issue as well. See ANDERSON, supra
note 21, at 133.  Even Justice O’Connor recognized this interest in fostering legitimacy through
descriptive minority representation when she observed in Grutter that the path to civic leadership
must be “visibly open to talented and qualified individuals from every race and ethnicity.” Grutter,
539 U.S. 306, 332.
245. See, e.g., supra note 54 (discussing research on citizens’ perceptions that racially diverse
juries are fairer than all White juries).
246. This is true in both the jury and representative bureaucracy contexts. See supra notes
61 and 157.
247. ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 151-52. (“Epistemic diversity follows from the ways
racial segregation and stigmatization shape individuals’ experiences.”).  Anderson offers evidence
of the value of this epistemic diversity in the contexts of policing and education. See id., 131-
132.
248. Justice Alito’s dissent in Fisher v. Univ. of Texas demonstrates this flawed reasoning.
Fisher v. Texas, 579 U.S. ____, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2221 (Alito, J., dissenting).
249. ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 131.
250. Id. See also SHARPE, supra note 158, and accompanying text (explaining the linkage
between differences in social identities and social experiences).
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the descriptive representation that increases democratic trust, it is also the
best proxy for achieving the desired epistemic diversity necessary for dem-
ocratic accountability to minority citizens.251
The final objection to affirmative race-conscious efforts in pursuit of
the diversity interest is that these efforts cause more harm than they are
worth by inflaming racial tensions and fueling racial discord.252  This, ac-
cording to critics, produces feelings of resentment against minorities on
behalf of those non-minorities who may be displaced by these race-con-
scious efforts.253 Allen helps us understand why the attention to ensuring
minority participation in the various civic institutions comprising our de-
mocracy, and the race-conscious means used to achieve this end, ought
not arouse resentment on behalf of those non-minorities who may be dis-
placed.254  She explains that between 1954 and 1964, during the apex of
the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence and the height of the Civil
Rights Movement, “the United States was reconstituted . . . with a prom-
ise of equality for all persons regardless of race, ethnicity or color.”255  This
began a process of redistribution of political power away from total control
by the racial majority in an attempt to realize the guarantee of equality
under law through shared political power for minority citizens.256  Allen is
251. ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 168.
252. See Sherer, supra note 21, at 617-22; see also King, supra note 51 (similarly suggesting
that race-conscious selection of juries breeds racial resentment).
253. Nancy Sherer catalogues the opposition arguments to efforts to increase judicial diver-
sity, which include among others claims that race-conscious selection reduces the quality of
judges and results in reverse discrimination against White males. Sherer, supra note 21, at 617-
622.  She concluded the first concern was more speculative than actual; id. at 620, and on the
matter of “reverse discrimination,” she found the debate has reached an impasse that can be
resolved only if proponents are able to identify “tangible benefits” that flow to White males from
supporting judicial diversity. Id. at 628-30.  Importantly, among the tangible benefits Sherer
suggests might flow from increased judicial diversity is “raising citizens’ levels of legitimacy to-
wards legal authorities.”  This in turn, Sherer argues, might produce additional tangible benefit
by “mak[ing] people more likely to obey the law . . . [and] fostering a more stable, law-abiding
society. . .” Id. at 631-632.
254. Claims alleging that non-minorities are harmed by affirmative, race-conscious efforts
to include racial and ethnic minorities are referred to as “reverse discrimination” claims. See e.g.
Sherer, supra note 21, at 620-624 (discussing perspective that appointment of judges to the bench
on the basis of diversity constitutes reverse discrimination).
255. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 1.
256. Allen describes this as “the long, slow end of its durable minority group . . . [and]
also disband[ing of] the durable majority.” Id. at 163.  Allen describes our “reconstitution” as
the remaking of our constitutional commitments and identifies several such “reconstitutions”
throughout American history, among them each of the major historic events that reshaped our
democratic structure and constitutional content, including for instance the Civil War itself, con-
stitutional amendments granting universal suffrage, and the 1950s Civil Rights Movement.  Allen
explains the 1950s reconstitution as the product of our collective rejection of the past patterns
and practices of a “citizenship of [racial] dominance.” Id. at 5.  She describes the Civil Rights
Movement that emerged during this time, and in particular the iconic images and events that
signified our collective moral, political and social struggle over desegregation, most particularly
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very clear to acknowledge that this reconstitution remains incomplete, but
also to remind us that the loss occasioned by the majority’s displacement as
a part of the redistribution of power is the inevitable consequence of de-
mocracy.257  The key to democracy, as Allen explains, is not in avoiding
loss but ensuring that there are no permanent losers.258
It is, therefore, not this temporal loss by majority citizens that betrays
the commitment to democratic equality, but rather our long-standing his-
toric practice of relegating racial minorities to perpetual losers in our de-
mocracy generally and in our judicial, law enforcement, and public
education systems specifically that betrays the commitment to democratic
equality.259  Affirmative, race-conscious efforts to ensure meaningful par-
ticipation by racial minorities in the “civic life of our nation” generally,
and in each of these key public domains specifically, are an attempt to
engender the trust that Allen tells us is necessary to ensure that minority
citizens do not feel like permanent losers.260  At the same time, they allow
for the epistemic diversity that Anderson says makes democratic institu-
tions more accountable to the interests of minority citizens so they are less
likely to actually suffer continual political losses in the future.261  As
demonstrated by the foregoing analysis, the analogies to the jury context
and the compelling interest in fostering democratic legitimacy through in-
creased diversity are significant, and it is at least arguable that this shared
interest justifies comparable race-conscious efforts in these other domains.
B. Narrowly Tailoring Efforts to Increase Racial Diversity Among Judges,
Police Offices, and Teachers
In addition to ensuring that race-conscious diversity efforts are justi-
fied by a compelling government interest, strict scrutiny requires that such
efforts be narrowly tailored to meet the asserted interest in diversity.262
Here too efforts to ensure racial diversity in jury selection and service are
in public schools, as a moment of transformation that challenged us to come up with “new
conceptions of democratic life” that would offer greater political protection for minority citizens
Id; see also ALLEN, supra note 19, at 163.
257. Id. at 19 (observing “since the 1950’s and 1960’s we have met the challenge to de-
velop new forms of citizenship with only limited success.”).
258. To guard against the potential destabilizing force of this loss, Allen recommends that
citizens engender the trust among themselves that allows for principles of reciprocity to mitigate
the pain of this temporal loss with the knowledge that there are no permanent winners or losers
in a democracy marked by true equality of citizenship. See ALLEN, supra note 19, at 68.
259. See discussion supra Section II.C.
260. Responding specifically to this objection, Anderson argues that because “[m]any ad-
vocates of colorblindness . . . acknowledge that the[se] race-conscious ends of affirmative action
are justified, and they object only to the use of race-conscious means. . . then how could it be
wrong to achieve this aim by the most relevant and narrowly tailored means available, which is
race-conscious selection.” ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 168.
261. Id. at 130.
262. See supra note 224.
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instructive.263  Theories of procedural justice and representative bureau-
cracy demonstrate that the compelling interest in promoting democratic
legitimacy through increased racial diversity applies with equal force in the
domains of judging, policing, and teaching as it does in the jury domain.
So strict scrutiny analysis should embrace as narrowly tailored in the judg-
ing, policing, and teaching domains the same types of efforts undertaken in
pursuit of this common interest in the jury domain.  This is not to ignore
the constitutional mandate that “context matters” when assessing strict
scrutiny.264  There are important differences in context between juries and
the other domains addressed here.265  Nevertheless, the analogies to the
jury context are significant insofar as the compelling interest in fostering
democratic legitimacy through increased diversity in each of these other
domains, and it is at least arguable that this shared interest justifies compa-
rable race-conscious efforts.
1. Race-Conscious Selection
Taking Batson as the centerpiece of the Supreme Court’s equal pro-
tection jurisprudence of jury selection, Batson reflects a constitutional
commitment to democratic equality in jury service that seeks to legitimize
our judicial system by ensuring that racial minorities are adequately repre-
sented on juries, particularly when minority interests are being adjudi-
cated.266  One key insight from Batson is the recognition that we should
not accord racial disparities in jury selection a presumption of non-dis-
crimination.267 Instead we should interrogate such racial disparities for any
evidence of discriminatory treatment.268  The same willingness to interro-
gate disparities in jury selection should be applied to the selection of
judges, police officers, and teachers.269
Batson also revealed that a necessary precondition for increasing racial
diversity among jurors is generating sufficient racial diversity among jury
263. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
264. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327.
265. For instance, jury selection is less defined by considerations of merit than is the selec-
tion of judges, police officers and teachers. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (describing
shift in jury selection from considerations of “probity and intelligence” to ensuring that jurors
reflect a “fair cross-section” of the community). Opportunities for service in these other domains
are also less plentiful than opportunities for jury service, which are much more widely available.
See ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 99-100. For the reasons explained herein, these differences
should not foreclose race-conscious efforts as a strategy for increasing racial diversity among
judges, police officers, and teachers. Id. at 151-52.
266. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
267. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 99.
268. Id. (acknowledging that peremptory strikes have the potential to mask discriminatory
treatment and therefore ought not be subject to a presumption of non-discrimination).
269. This is particularly true where selection methods include the exercise of subjective
discretion like peremptory challenges, which the Court found particularly troublesome in Bat-
son. Id.
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pools.270  Jury commissioners and judges across the country have adopted
an array of race-conscious methods for selecting citizens for jury duty gen-
erally and jury service specifically to address this problem.271  These prac-
tices range from jury commissioners thoughtfully selecting juror source
lists with an eye towards increasing the number of racial minorities called
for jury service, to judges carefully managing jury selection to ensure racial
diversity among those seated on the petit jury.272  In some cases these ef-
forts go so far as adopting formal rules mandating racial proportionality
between seated jurors in individual cases and the local population cen-
sus.273  These efforts can be traced in part to enactment of the 1968 Jury
Selection and Service Act, which abandoned the former system of elite
juror selection that prized only “men of recognized probity and intelli-
gence” in favor of a selection system that values jurors who reflect a fair
cross-section of the community.274  The Jury Selection and Service Act
expressly recognizes racial diversity as indispensable to the guarantee of
democratic equality in jury selection and service.275
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 is analogous to the Jury Se-
lection and Service Act of 1968.  The express goal of the Civil Service
Reform Act is not “merely ending discrimination” in federal employment
but “taking proactive steps to increase the representation of . . . people of
color in the civil service” until the government “looks like America.”276
270. See Fukurai & Davies, supra note 51, at 649-652 (cataloguing a number of practical
impediments to greater racial diversity among jury pools, including lack of diversity among juror
source lists, such as voter registration lists, relative to the population; high rates of transience
among minority residents that cause jury summonses to be returned undeliverable; and higher
rates of excusal for economic hardship).
271. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 79-82.
273. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the Hennepin County, MN
grand jury model). Similar proportional models are used in other jurisdictions. See Alschuler,
supra note 76, at 711-712 (describing the jury selection process in DeKalb County, Georgia,
where “jury commissioners divide jury lists into thirty-six demographic groups . . . then use a
computer to ensure the proportional representation of every group on every venire” and other
“[s]imilar color-conscious jury selection methods in use in other jurisdictions to . . . ensure
racial proportionality in the initial pool from which petit and grand juries are drawn.”).
274. For instance, the “key man” system of relying on personal referrals of potential jurors
in the federal system was replaced with a lottery system where names of potential jurors are
drawn from voter registration lists or actual voter rolls.  Additionally, the Act instructed that if
existing juror source lists failed to produce a level of racial diversity among prospective jurors
adequate to meet the “fair cross-section” requirement, then supplemental source lists should be
added as needed, such as driver’s license records or even public utility records, to achieve the
required level of racial diversity among those prospective jurors summonsed for jury duty. See
ABRAMSON, supra note 17, at 117.
275. Id.
276. SHARPE, supra note 154, at 35. Rejecting an exclusive value for “neutral compe-
tence,” the Civil Service Reform Act acknowledges racial diversity as a key criterion of selection
for public service under principles of representative bureaucracy. Id. at 140.
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Its purpose is to diversify the federal civil service in the same way that the
Jury Selection and Service Act has promoted increased racial diversity
among jurors.277  And just as the race-conscious methods identified above
have replaced more elitist selection methods as the primary source of juror
selection, attention to principles of representative bureaucracy have supple-
mented the merit selection system to broaden the scope of hiring for the
federal civil service.278  If the Jury Selection and Service Act is the consti-
tutional baseline for both federal and state jury selection, so too the Civil
Service Reform Act ought to be viewed as the constitutional baseline for
both federal and state civil service selection for judges, police officers, and
teachers.279
Race-conscious selection processes that are targeted and deliberate in
their attention to improving racial diversity among judges, police officers,
and teachers ought to be constitutionally permissible if they are pursued in
the same way such efforts have been pursued in the jury context.280  These
efforts ought to include targeted outreach and recruitment of diverse ap-
plicants as well as race-conscious selection strategies designed to improve
the diversity yield among judicial appointments, as well as law enforcement
and teacher hires.281  Some of these efforts are already being pursued at the
federal, state and local levels to increase racial diversity among judges.282
Similar efforts ought to be adopted in the recruitment and hiring of police
277. See SHARPE, supra note 154, at xi; see also id. at 36-37 (describing the purpose of the
Civil Service Reform Act as making the federal workforce “reflective of the nation’s diversity”
and as going beyond mere non-discrimination to ensure “full representation.”).  Just like the
“key man” jury system, with its emphasis on “men of recognized intelligence and probity,”
dominated federal jury selection prior to the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, principles
of “merit selection,” with an exclusive emphasis on “neutral competence,” dictated civil service
employment prior to adoption of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Id. at 140.
278. Id.
279. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
280. Although some political scientists have called for racial quotas to satisfy the dictates of
representative bureaucracy, it is clear that such measures are politically and legally untenable in
the United States. See SHARPE, supra note 154, at 27 (calling for racial quotas to satisfy the need
for representative bureaucracy); but see Mallory v. Harkness, 895 F. Supp. 1556 (1995) (finding
racial quotas on judicial nominating commission unconstitutional); compare Talbert v. City of
Richmond, 648 F.2d 925 (1981) (declining to find constitutional violation in promotion of
Black police officer over White officer where achieving racial diversity was a legitimate interest
and where procedures employed not generate racially disparate impact for White officers or
demonstrate discrimination in selection procedure).
281. These are comparable to the targeted outreach to minority prospective jurors in the
jury context. See supra note 79-82.
282. In a study of state judicial appointments, Leo Romero found that twelve states require
that the judicial nomination commission include members who are racially diverse in an effort to
increase the selection of racially diverse judges.  Leo M. Romero, Enhancing Diversity in An Ap-
pointive System of Selecting Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 485 (2007).  Many states include some
language in their appointment process requiring the consideration of racial diversity in judicial
appointments. Id. Not surprisingly, Romero found those states with the most explicit considera-
tion of racial diversity in the judicial appointment process were also the states with the most
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officers and public school teachers.283  Such race-conscious efforts are a
critical tool for achieving and maintaining diversity among these key pub-
lic decision-makers, thereby fostering the trust and accountability neces-
sary to legitimize the judiciary, law enforcement, and public education as
key democratic institutions.284
At the very least, diversity must be expressly identified as a goal in the
selection of judges, police officers, and teachers.285 Data show, for in-
stance, that state judicial appointment systems that include diversity as an
express goal have more diverse benches than those without an express
commitment to diversity.286  But to have maximum effect, just as jury
commissioners have undertaken race-conscious efforts to ensure jury pools
are as diverse as possible, so too should race-conscious efforts in the selec-
tion of judges, police officers, and teachers be focused on expanding the
diversity of the applicant pool.287  These targeted recruitment efforts are
likely to both enhance the diversity of the candidates who are ultimately
selected for these positions, as well as reduce liability under prevailing
equal protection law by focusing race-conscious efforts on recruitment
rather than selection.288
racially and ethnically diverse benches. Id.; see also Spellisey, Chase & Greenman, supra note 23
(describing state court efforts to increase judicial diversity).
283. Notably, some efforts to improve racial diversity in the law enforcement and public
education contexts have been struck down. See, e.g., Lomack v. City of Newark, 463 F.3d 303
(3rd Cir. 2006) (finding fire department involuntary transfer policy to promote diversity violate
equal protection); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down school
district attempt to achieve racial balance among school teachers as unconstitutional). But others
have been upheld, see supra note 147.
284. For a discussion of the current racial disparities in the representation of judges, police
officers, and teachers, see supra Section II.C.; see also Sklansky, supra note 200, 1236-1238 (noting
the decline in diversity of police forces after affirmative action effort abandoned after the 1970s
and ’80s.).
285. See Romero, supra note 282, at 486 (“To achieve diversity in an appointive system, the
people involved . . . must be directed to consider diversity at the different stages of the process.”).
Romero suggests this goal can be established by law, as it is in the Civil Service Reform Act, or
by formal rule, or informal practice. Id.
286. Id. at 498 (describing the success of New Mexico’s race-conscious judicial appoint-
ment efforts); see also Malia Reddick, Michael J. Nelson & Rachel Paine Caufield, Racial and
Gender Diversity and State Courts, Vol. 48, No. 3 THE JUDGES’ J. at 5 (2009) (concluding that
states with express commitments to judicial diversity “attract more diverse applicants and select
more diverse [judicial] nominees.”).
287. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (describing race-conscious efforts to expand
the diversity of jury pools).
288. See Stacy Hawkins, How Diversity Can Redeem the McDonnell Douglas Test: Mounting an
Effective Title VII Defense of the Commitment to Diversity in the Legal Profession, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2457, 2479-80 (2015) (describing both the success and legal defensibility under Title VII
of targeted or expanded recruitment of diverse applicants); compare use of racial quotas in selec-
tion, Mallory v. Harkness, 895 F. Supp. 1556 (1995).  Such targeted outreach efforts in the
judicial appointment system can include posting job notices with minority professional organiza-
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2. Measuring Diversity by the Fair-Cross Section Standard
Continuing the jury analogy, efforts to increase racial diversity
among judges, police officers, and teachers  should focus on achieving a
“fair cross-section” of diversity within each of these domains.289  Notably,
the fair cross-section jury requirement is a guarantee only that the jury
venire, from which the petit jury in any individual case is ultimately
drawn, is representative of the community.290  It is not a guarantee that
every petit jury serving in any individual case will be representative of a
fair cross-section of the community.291  So too the requirement for a fair-
cross section of judges, police officers, and teachers should ensure that the
overall demographic composition of these professions at the local level ap-
propriately reflects the racial diversity of the communities they will be
called upon to serve.292
tions and including statements in those postings encouraging applications by diverse candidates.
Romero, supra note 282, at 494.
289. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing the fair cross-section in the jury
context).  Some scholars have instead argued that efforts to increase racial diversity among judges
should strive for achieving a “critical mass” of diversity akin to the standard adopted for minority
student admissions in Grutter. See Vargas, supra note 141, at 109 and 152 (Relying on and ex-
tending the reasoning in Grutter to argue quest for judicial diversity “must be understood to go
beyond token appointments . . . to achieve a critical mass of minority judges on each bench.”)
Although Vargas grounds this claim for a critical mass of minority judges in the need for judicial
accountability by leveraging the epistemic or discursive diversity of minority judges so that they
can “tell experiential narratives as to why race matters in specific [ ] contexts,” there is an
equally strong basis for grounding it in the need for fostering judicial legitimacy. Id. Phoebe
Haddon has argued this point in reverse by suggesting that Grutter should allow the fair cross-
section requirement to justify race-conscious selection of petit jurors. See Haddon, supra note
114, at 553-554 (2004) (“Grutter creates the possibility for litigants to encourage courts to carry
over the interest in a fair cross section at the venire stage to the composition of the jury because
participants with a variety of backgrounds have the potential to move beyond their own isolated
views in deliberation.”); Adam Lamparello & Cynthia Swann The New Affirmative Action After
Fisher v. University of Texas: Defining Educational Diversity through the Sixth Amendment’s Cross-
Section Requirement (unpublished) at 15, http://production.sw.works.bepress.com/
adam_lamparello/48/ (“The cross-section requirement facilitates such a holistic view of diversity
because, by not mandating that juries mirror the racial and ethnic  demographics of a commu-
nity, the Court implicitly recognizes that a true cross-section of the community is reflected by
characteristics beyond race and ethnicity. .  . it avoids the quantitative approach to diversity that
Grutter’s ‘critical mass’ standard creates.”).
290. The fair cross-section requirement is borrowed from the Sixth Amendment jury trial
guarantee, rather than the equal protection clause’s guarantee of racial equality, but the principles
work together to achieve the object of ensuring racial diversity in jury service. See ABRAMSON,
supra note 17, at 118; see also Heyman, supra note 87, at 228 (“jury pool cases . . . were initially
decided on 14th Amendment grounds, but have more recently migrated into the 6th
Amendment.”)
291. Id.
292. This could also be compared to calls for a “critical mass” of racial and ethnic minority
students on college and university campuses in the educational context. See Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 229 (identifying a “critical mass” of underrepresented minority students as the
proper measure of diversity necessary to attain the educational benefits of student diversity).
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For instance, the diversity of judges sitting in a particular district or
circuit in the federal judiciary, or serving a particular county or other judi-
cial subdivision in the state should be reflective of the diversity of that
district, circuit, county or judicial subdivision.293  Similarly, police officers
and teachers ought to reflect the racial and ethnic  composition of the local
communities they serve.294  This is particularly important where the im-
pairments to trust and accountability suffered by these communities are
not equally distributed across racial groups.  For instance, in the context of
policing and public education, the data show that there is much greater
distrust between Black communities and law enforcement than for in-
stance Asian communities and law enforcement.295  Similarly, our public
schools are failing Black and Hispanic students at a far higher rate than it
currently fails Asian American or white students.296  For these reasons, it is
important to incorporate the lesson of representative bureaucracy theory
into the selection and hiring of judges, police officers, and teachers by
realizing that racial congruence between citizens and these key public de-
cision-makers is necessary for generating the accountability and trust
needed to legitimize the judicial system, law enforcement, and public edu-
cation as key sites of civic participation in the eyes of our increasingly
diverse citizenry.297
But, consistent with the fair cross-section standard, this requirement
would not guarantee that all judges assigned to individual cases, police of-
ficers assigned to neighborhood beats, or teachers in every school are pro-
portionally representative of the litigants, residents, or students in each of
these discrete contexts.  Inevitably, however, as we have seen with efforts
to increase racial diversity in jury service, efforts to ensure that judges,
police officers, and teachers represent a fair cross-section of the communi-
ties they serve in the aggregate will likely translate into improvements in
the racial and ethnic  diversity of judges presiding in individual cases in-
volving minority litigants, police officers patrolling minority neighbor-
hoods, and teachers serving minority students.298  These increases in the
293. As Sherrilyn Ifill has observed “. . . at some fundamental level we all understand the
importance of judicial diversity” pointing specifically to the way our “tradition of appointing
judges that more or less reflect the geographic make-up of the circuit” is an acknowledgement of
this diversity principle. See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judicial Diversity, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 45, 46-47
(2009).
294. Current data suggest we are far from that goal. See Putnam supra note 182, at 2 (data
on teachers); see also supra note 201 (data on police officers).
295. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
298. This is not to suggest that these jury diversity efforts have been universally successful
or that they are without criticism.  Obstacles continue to exist in achieving adequate racial diver-
sity among jury pools that continue to result in the disproportionate exclusion of racial minori-
ties from jury service. See Fukurai & Davies, supra note 51, at 650-653 (cataloguing the various
reasons why juries remain unrepresentative including: (1) continued reliance on voter registration
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racial diversity of judges, police officers, and teachers will promote greater
democratic legitimacy by fostering trust and ensuring accountability on
behalf of minority citizens.299
CONCLUSION
The jury is rightly revered in America for reflecting our highest aspi-
rations for representative democracy, and in particular for striving to real-
ize the guarantee of democratic equality on behalf of minority citizens.
Procedural justice theory helps explain why issues of race, and in particular
attention to guaranteeing racial diversity, has always figured so prominently
in our constitutional jury jurisprudence.  Racially diverse juries foster the
trust and accountability necessary to legitimize our judicial system in the
eyes of a diverse citizenry.  But these principles ought not be confined to
the jury context.  The jury is merely instructive for how we ought to do
democracy more broadly. Representative bureaucracy theory helps extend
the claim for racial diversity as a guarantee of democratic equality from the
jury to other equally important sites of civic participation in our democ-
racy.  The research on representative bureaucracy demonstrates that racial
diversity among judges, police officers, and teachers is equally critical to
fostering trust and promoting accountability to minority citizens in the
judicial, law enforcement, and public education domains.
Borrowing from the Supreme Court’s jury jurisprudence, as embod-
ied in Batson and its progeny, we can identify principles and strategies for
achieving racial diversity that can be applied in these other domains.  By
adopting race-conscious efforts designed to achieve a fair cross-section of
racial diversity among judges, police officers, and teachers, we can ensure
“[e]ffective participation by members of all racial groups in the civic life
of our Nation,” and prevent the kinds of harms that political philosopher
Denise Allen cautions would threaten the stability of our democracy and
subvert our aspirations for government of the people, by the people, and
for the people.300
lists, (2) infrequent updating of jury lists; (3) the jury questionnaire; (4) subjective disqualifica-
tions during voir dire; (5) economic hardship excusals among minority hourly wage workers;
and (6) ongoing discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges.).  The point is that
deliberate race-conscious efforts are occurring in the jury context that are justified by principles
of democratic equality, and these efforts are yielding improvements in jury diversity.
299. See supra note 131.
300. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
